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di·no·saur 
 
noun \ˈdī-nə-ˌsȯr\  
1:  one of many reptiles that lived on Earth millions of years ago 
2:  someone or something that is no longer useful or current: an 
obsolete or out-of-date person or thing 
3:  one that is impractically large, out-of-date, or obsolete.1 
 
 
I. WHAT IF 
 
What if dinosaurs had adapted to meet changing environmental 
circumstances?  History shows that this was not to be.  The passing 
of dinosaurs has become the defining measure of a failure to adapt.  
Their fate:  extinction.   
This same fate potentially awaits the Social Security Disability 
Insurance program.  On March 14, 2013, Joyce Manchester, the then-
Chief, Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) Long-Term Analysis 
Unit, testified before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the 
Committee on Ways and Means.2  Her prognosis was dire: 
The DI program’s rapid expansion and the projected gap between 
its spending and dedicated revenues in the future raise questions 
about the financial sustainability of the program. Since 2009, the 
program has been paying out more in annual benefits than it receives 
                                                            
* The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and not those of 
the United States Government, the Social Security Administration or any 
component thereof.  The author teaches as a member of the adjunct faculty at the 
University of Tulsa, College of Law; has prior service as United States Magistrate 
Judge, Northern District, Oklahoma; and currently serves as a federal 
Administrative Law Judge.   
1 Dinosaur, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/dinosaur. 
2 The Social Security Disability Insurance Program Before the Subcomm. on 
Social Security Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 8 (2013) (testimony of 
Joyce Manchester, Chief, Long-Term Analysis Unit, Cong. Budget Office). 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43995_DI-
Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Manchester Testimony]. 
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in taxes and in interest on the balances in its trust fund.9 CBO 
projects that the DI trust fund will be exhausted in 2016, nearly 20 
years before the projected exhaustion of the trust fund for the Social 
Security retirement program.3 
Ms. Manchester made yet another observation regarding Social 
Security trust fund operations – one likely unknown to most 
Americans: “If a trust fund’s balance falls to zero and current 
revenues are insufficient to cover the benefits that are specified in 
law and administrative expenses, SSA [the Social Security 
Administration] has no legal authority to pay full benefits when they 
are due.”4 The Congressional Budget Office also projected that the 
Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) fund would reach 
exhaustion in 2038.5  If, as was done in 1994, funds are re-directed 
from the OASI fund to the DI fund, in effect combining the two, the 
projected exhaustion for both programs is 2034.6 
Is this the future of the Social Security Disability Insurance 
program?  Is it, like the dinosaurs, doomed to extinction?  If so, at 
what price?  Are steps being taken to address the issues?   
Consider the following exchange between Congressman Darrell 
Issa of California and then-Acting Commissioner Carolyn Colvin in a 
June 11, 2014 hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform.7   
 
Chairman Issa: 
“Do you believe that Congress needs to give greater authority, 
not greater money, greater authority, to fire, to reform, to review if 
                                                            
3 Id. at n. 9. “Federal trust funds, including those for Social Security, 
essentially constitute an accounting mechanism for tracking the relationship 
between a program’s spending and the revenues that are dedicated to that program. 
In a given year, the sum of a fund’s receipts along with the interest that is credited 
on previous balances, minus spending for benefits and administrative costs, equals 
a trust fund’s surplus or deficit.” Id.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Social Security Testimony Regarding Oversight of Federal Disability 
Programs Before the Oversight and Government Reform Comm., 113th Cong. 
(2014) (testimony of Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Comm’r, SSA), 
http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_061114.html.  
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you are in fact going to represent the American people's best interest 
of their tax dollars?” 
 
Ms. Colvin: 
“I am not prepared to answer that question. I think that I would 
have to look at what the Merit Systems Review Board challenges are. 
I think that perhaps there could be some improvements there.” 
 
Chairman Issa:  
“Ma'am, I asked you a question and I just want the answer to the 
question.  You cannot, here today, if I hear you correctly, identify 
one area of authority or flexibility — not money; authority or 
flexibility — that would enhance your ability to protect the American 
people's taxpayer dollars?” 
 
Ms. Colvin: 
“I would be very happy to give you a thoughtful response at a 
later time on that.” 
 
Chairman Issa: 
Instead of recommending reforms to the broken and wasteful 
disability appeals process your only suggestion was to express 
support for the recommendation of Rep. Gerald Conolly that 
Congress reallocate the payroll tax in order to fund the disability trust 
fund after 2016 when it will be bankrupt.  A bailout of the disability 
fund after at least a decade of serious agency mismanagement and at 
the expense of the SSA retirement program, without meaningful 
reforms to a broken appeals process and disability re-evaluation 
process, is not a responsible solution. 
_______ 
 
  Chairman Issa emphasized the need for fundamental reformation 
of the disability process.  He sought to understand the past in order to 
guide the agency’s future action, saying, “it is important that that the 
agency understand the full scope of the problem.”8   Is this just 
political “gotcha,” or does it signal a more significant substantive 
inquiry?   
                                                            
8 Id. 
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The Acting Commissioner’s responses to Chairman Issa’s request 
for solutions also raised questions, not only in the general absence of 
a “big-picture” response, but in the specific absence of a 
comprehensive, forward-looking policy, able to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  At stake is the formulation of a policy protocol, 
which anticipates future changes rather than assesses blame for past 
mistakes.  This article focuses upon the hearings and appeals process 
as a critical component of the Title II Disability Insurance (DI) 
program.  It is here that the program has its highest public profile.  It 
is here that Americans seek not only help but also justice.9   
This article proposes a simple theme.  While many issues plague 
the Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security 
Income programs, only reform of the hearings and appeals process 
can solve the decades-long (and growing) hearings backlog.  Only 
then, can the remaining questions regarding the solvency of the DI 
trust fund be meaningfully addressed.  As it now stands, the ongoing 
backlog of pending hearings and appeals feeds the twin plagues of 
rising costs and increasing delay.  These are the very issues that 
                                                            
9 Other significant questions also arise in any examination of the DI program, 
not the least of which are the criteria by which disability benefits are awarded.  
Other issues are equally important, many of which are structural in nature and 
concern program implementation.  These include revision of the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines, which, at present, among other assumptions, presumes that 
a fifty year old, limited to unskilled sedentary work (sit-down jobs) would be 
unable to find a significant number of such jobs within the national or regional 
economies and is, therefore, “disabled” – even though he/she can, in fact, work at a 
sit-down job.  Other questions are equally telling.  Such as: 
 
1. Why are disability applications from persons who seek Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act 
measured by the same legal standard as persons who seek Disability Insurance 
Benefits under II?  In many instances, SSI applicants have little or no meaningful 
or sustained work as adults and so the declared inability to work rings hollow when 
measured against those with a lifetime of work.   
 
2.  Why are attorney fees predicated on the passage of time (past due benefits) 
and not expertise?  Why does the Agency reward attorneys with a larger attorney 
fee the longer it takes to decide a case when there is a rising backlog of pending 
hearings, causing ever-increasing delays in the hearings and appeals process?  
These are but a few of the many questions now being asked of the DI Program. 
 
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drove the federal courts in the passage of the Civil Justice Reform 
Act of 1990 (CJRA).10   
What follows is an overview of the now-antiquated Social 
Security Disability hearings and appeals process – a process that has 
not substantively changed since the inception of the DI program; nor 
with the later adoption of the SSI program in 1972.  As such, the 
system is a “dinosaur” – one that yet survives.  In considering a nom 
de guerre for this system, only one is fitting:  the “King of 
Administrative Adjudications,” or Adjudicasaurus Rex. 
Can he be saved? 
 
 
II. ADJUDICASAURUS REX 
 
Adjudicasaurus Rex is the statutorily created hearings and appeals 
function of the Social Security Administration, established by the 
Social Security Act.11  An appeal from an underlying administrative 
determination by the Social Security Administration is governed in 
part by 20 C.F.R. §404.900 (a)(3) which provides: “If you are 
dissatisfied with the reconsideration determination, you may request 
a hearing before an administrative law judge.”   
Adjudicasaurus Rex claims the title of King of Administrative 
Adjudications, long outmoded, surviving still, despite growing 
backlogs, ever more revelations of fraud and abuse and a legal 
landscape whose evolutionary course has long since deigned that 
creatures such as Adjudicasaurus Rex should be no longer.  Its tale is 
told yet today in the hallowed halls of Congress and in the 
courtrooms of the nation.  It is a tale of woe, for within its workings 
                                                            
10 Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH & LEE L. 
REV. 89, 90 (Winter 1993). “Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act during 
1990 because of mounting concern over abuse in civil litigation, particularly in the 
discovery process; the growing costs of resolving civil lawsuits; and decreasing 
federal court access in those cases.  For a decade and a half, many federal judges, 
led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, had contended that the federal judiciary was 
experiencing a litigation explosion and increasing discovery and litigation abuse.” 
Id. 
11 42 U.S.C. §205(b) (1981). 
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lies the timeworn ways of bygone times.12  While Adjudicasaurus 
Rex appears strong and enduring, he lacks the ability, innate or 
otherwise, to adapt to an ever-dynamic social-legal environment and 
shall soon pass as a legacy of national history – a victim of a failure 
to evolve.  The agency has not sought to change an adjudicatory 
model that has subsisted in its present form for more than 50 years.  
Given the shortcomings of earlier solutions, the present backlog 
augurs for change.  
When first devised, the hearings process was conceived as “non-
adversarial”, adopting an inquisitorial jurisprudence akin to that 
found in judicial systems in continental Europe, this in response to 
the fact that few persons were represented by counsel.13  Professor 
Robert M. Viles undertook a comprehensive study of the Social 
Security disability system in 1968.14 He described the 1968 hearing 
procedure in the words of one [then] hearing examiner [now, 
administrative law judge] as follows: 
In 99% of the cases, people come in without any representation. 
It is my job to represent those people when they come in. It seems 
strange, but we use the terminology that we “wear three hats.” We 
put on the first hat, and we represent the claimant, we present all the 
testimony on his behalf, and drag it out of him by questioning. We 
then represent the government, the Social Security Administration, 
and search the law--that's the second hat. We search our minds, and 
we search whatever other records are available, we search the 
                                                            
12 Robert M. Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers . . . 
and Poor People Too, Part II, 40 MISS. L. J. 24, 59 (1968).    
Dean Robert M. Viles, in his thorough 1968 Mississippi Law Journal article, 
describing the Social Security Administration, noted that lawyers did not have a 
role under the Social Security Act:  
The original Social Security Act of 1935 was silent on the 
question of representation of claimants for benefits.  In 1939, 
however, §206 was enacted with the following explanation:  
‘While it is not contemplated that the services of an agent or 
attorney will be necessary in presenting the vast majority of 
claims, the experience of other agencies would indicate that 
where such services are performed the fees charged therefor 
should be subject to regulation by the Board [now 
Administration], and it is so provided.  
Id. at 59 (emphasis added).  
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
 
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evidence, and we present the best case that the government has. Then 
we turn around and put on the third hat, and we decide which 
evidence is most favorable, and in whose behalf.15 
But for one element, this forty-seven year-old description of the 
disability hearings process from 1968 precisely mirrors that of 
today’s hearings.  The variance?  As contrasted with claimant 
representation in 1968, in today’s world more than 80% of all 
claimants are represented, most by attorneys.16  This constitutes a 
dramatic change in the legal milieu, effectively rendering the current, 
longstanding hearings process obsolete.   
Designed for a time when few persons were represented, the 
current hearings and appeals process at Title 20 CFR Part 404 
§900(b) describes itself in contrast to the adversarial court system, as 
“informal” and “nonadversarial:” 
In making a determination or decision in your case, we conduct 
the administrative review process in an informal, nonadversary 
manner. In each step of the review process, you may present any 
information you feel is helpful to your case . . . You may present the 
information yourself or have someone represent you, including an 
attorney.17  
Today, the overwhelming presence of lawyers in the disability 
appeals system dramatically changes the hearings dynamic, for 
American lawyers are advocates, trained to operate in a highly 
structured legal milieu in which the descriptor, “non-adversarial,” 
simply does not apply.18  The American adversarial system of justice 
                                                            
15 Viles, supra note 12 at 40-41. 
16 See, e.g. Claimant Representatives Barred from Practicing Before the Social 
Security Administration, A-12-07-17057, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN. (Sept. 2007), http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-12-
07-17057_0.pdf [hereinafter A-12-07-17057] (showing that in fiscal year 2006, of 
the 559,000 claims heard by Administrative law judges, 439,000 were represented 
by attorney and non-attorney advocates, representing claimants in almost 80% of 
all claims appealed.  Examined another way, the OIG notes, “[i]n FY 2006, 
approximately 26,000 attorneys and 5,000 non-attorneys represented claimants 
before ODAR.”). Id.  
1720 C.F.R. §404.900 (b) (2015).  
18 See Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary 
System, 64 INDIANA L.J. 301 (1989), who writes:  “The hallmark of American 
adjudication is the adversary system. The virtues of the adversary system, are so 
 
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contemplates two opposing parties, each seeking to defeat the other, 
made possible only with the adoption of comprehensive rules of 
procedure, evidence, and legal ethics, all designed to ensure a fair 
and impartial trial.19  
Given the resulting and expected high levels of advocacy, the 
adversarial system is structured to restrict ‘win-at-all costs’ 
conduct,20 all the while encouraging advocacy – all within the 
bounds of a fair trial.21  The adversarial system of justice is framed 
by rules of ethical conduct, bounded in both the civil and criminal 
courts by highly specific rules of procedure and evidence, bolstered 
further by ancillary procedures designed to foster alternative dispute 
                                                            
deeply engrained in the American legal psyche that most lawyers do not question 
it.” Id. 
19 Id. at 304-05. 
Once the evidence is presented, it must be interpreted, 
leaving room for further indeterminacy. These problems with 
reconstructing the past are a primary reason for the existence of 
burdens of proof. Each party to a dispute must try to persuade the 
trier of fact that his version of the facts corresponds to truth, and 
someone must bear the risk of nonpersuasion. 
Id. (Citations omitted.) 
20 Id. at 307-08. 
A third goal of a procedural system is behavior modification. 
Behavior modification is, of course, significantly tied to the 
substantive legal rules that are being applied, but the procedural 
system itself promotes this goal by providing sanctions for 
behavior that is disapproved in the substantive rules. All 
procedural systems do this to some extent because substantive 
rules that emerge from litigation, coupled with the likelihood of 
sanctions, affect how non-parties behave in the future. 
Id. (Citations omitted.) 
21 See e.g., Preamble and Scope, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model
_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_s
cope.html, providing in-part: 
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually 
harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a 
lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the 
same time assume that justice is being done. 
Id. 
 
10 	

 !"
resolution.22  Codified by a variety of state and federal laws, 
including the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA)23 as well as the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,24 among others, 
ancillary procedures within the adversarial judicial system 
contemplate early resolution of claims by means other than trial.25  
As a result, the overwhelming majority of claims filed in the federal 
civil courts are resolved before trial.26  Not so in the antiquated 
Social Security system of hearings and appeals, where the 
overwhelming majority of claims filed are tried before an 
administrative law judge.  See, infra, Figures 1 and 2. 
                                                            
22 See Nancy A. Welsh, The Current Transitional State of Court-Connected 
ADR, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 873 (2012), who observes: 
Obviously, there is much to commend in court-connected 
mediation and what it offers to people caught up in disputes . . . 
Proponents of court-connected mediation can also point to a 
multitude of accomplishments. For example, and most strikingly, 
many cases settle in mediation. For the vast majority of those 
cases, litigants express satisfaction with the process and indicate 
that they had the opportunity to express themselves, that the other 
parties heard them, that they had input into the outcome, and that 
they view the process as fair.  
Id. 
23 The Civil Justice Reform Act , 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2013). 
24 28 U.S.C. §651 (2013). 
25 Id. at n.1, (citing JENNIFER E. SHACK, RESOL. SYS. INST., BIBLIOGRAPHIC 
SUMMARY OF COST, PACE, AND SATISFACTION STUDIES OF COURT-RELATED 
MEDIATION PROGRAMS, 7 (2d ed. 2007)) (stating “58% of unlimited cases and 71% 
of limited cases settled as a result of mediation.”). Roselle L. Wissler, The 
Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT 
RESOL. Q. 55, 58 (2004) (reporting that “[m]ost studies reported a settlement rate 
between 47 and 78 percent.”). 
26 See e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and 
Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes,  J. OF 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD, 659, 664 (Nov. 2004) (noting that between 1987 and 
1996, 2,357,591 legal actions were filed in the federal courts.  Of that number, only 
74,253 or 3% were tried to conclusion…). 
 
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Figure 1 
 
Source: Social Security Administration 27 
 
Figure 1 depicts National Hearing Decisions since 2008; while 
Figure 2 indicates National Hearing Receipts or filings during this 
same period. 
                                                            
27 Hearings and Appeals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://ssa.gov/appeals/#a0=3 (last 
visited, May 25, 2015). 
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Figure 2 
 
Source:  Social Security Administration 28  
 
In Fiscal Year 2014, 810,715 Requests for Hearing (before an 
Administrative Law Judge) were filed by Social Security disability 
claimants.  Of that number, 680,963 hearing decisions were issued.  
The significance? Eighty-four percent of all Requests for Hearing 
were tried, as contrasted with less than 10% in the federal courts. 
During this same period, between 2008 and the present, the 
agency has increased the size of its corps of administrative law 
judges.  This has not, however, slowed the increasing backlog of 
pending hearings.  See, infra, Figure 5.   The issue is not, therefore, 
the productivity of judges, who are more productive than at any other 
time but is, instead, a reflection of the inherent inability of the current 
adjudicatory system to successfully adapt to a fundamentally altered 
legal environment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
28 Id. 
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III. ADJUDICASAURUS REX ENDANGERED! 
 
Adjudicasaurus Rex thrives within a complex multifactorial29 
legal climate his genesis found within the environs of a vast 
antediluvian tidal expanse, bounded by the caverns of Woodlawn, 
Maryland, the plains of Falls Church, Virginia and the bogs of 
Washington, D.C.30  Despite his birth in the nation’s capital, he 
roams the nation, seeking succor within 168 hearing offices and ten 
regional offices.31  Within these offices he finds his true environs, the 
cloistered spaces of his evolving habitat – the dangerous evolutionary 
realms of the legal landscape.  It is here that Adjudicasaurus Rex has 
lived; and it is here he now finds what may be his imminent demise.  
The Social Security disability appeals system, structured under the 
Social Security Act and established as the Office of Disability 
Adjudication and Review (ODAR) is the unchallenged “King” of all 
administrative adjudicatory systems.  In 2015, ODAR is home to 
more than 1,500 federal administrative law judges (ALJs), each 
appointed under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).32   
The Commissioner of Social Security is charged with hearing and 
deciding matters arising under Title II and Title XVI of the Social 
Security Act.  Title 42 United States Code (USC) § 405(a) calls for 
the Commissioner “to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the 
rights of any individual applying for a payment under this [title].”  
                                                            
29 Id., mul·ti·fac·tor \-ˈfak-tər\ :  having, involving, or produced by a variety of 
elements or causes. 
30 Adam Karlin, From Virginia through Maryland and up to Delaware, the 
Eastern Shore comprises a string of protected wetlands and preserved beaches, 
interspersed with resort towns, WASHINGTON, D.C., CITY GUIDE, 232 (May 1, 
2010).  
31 Hearings Office Locator, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, SOC. 
SEC.ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/ho_locator.html (last visited 
May 2, 2015). 
32 Hearings and Appeals, Administrative Law Judge Disposition Data, SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/03_ALJ_Disposition_Data.html. (last visited 
May 2, 2015). 
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The APA recites that “the agency” or “one or more administrative 
law judges appointed under section 3105 of this title” “shall preside 
at the taking of evidence.”33 
The role of the administrative law judge stands as one of the 
critically important provisions of the APA, ensuring a separation of 
function between judges and others within the agency, “by separating 
those in the agency who investigate and prosecute from those who 
hear and decide . . . APA hearings are conducted by independent 
administrative law judges, who are not subject to agency control.  
ALJs are not permitted to "consult a person or party on a fact in 
issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate."34  
Decisional independence by the administrative judiciary is a 
recognized hallmark of the APA, ensuring fundamentally fair and 
impartial decision-making through due process of law in 
administrative adjudications.   
Despite APA protections, the Social Security Administration 
stands on the brink of a convergence of circumstances which may, 
absent fundamental corrective action, lead the American people to 
lament the fate of the nation’s preeminent disability program, 
examining the bones of its bureaucratic remains in future histories, 
much like a fossilized skeleton of some great dinosaur of ages past.  
This is not so much a doomsday prediction, as it is a factual 
assessment.35     
                                                            
33 5 U.S.C. §556(a).  
34 Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 
TULSA L. J. 203, 208 (1996).  See also the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 554. 
35 See,, e.g., Javier Meseguer, Outcome Variation in the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program: The Role of Primary Diagnoses, SOC. SEC. 
BULLETIN (Vol. 73 No. 2, 2013) who writes: 
From 1970 through 2009, the number of beneficiaries in the 
DI [Disability Insurance] program more than tripled, while DI 
expenditures increased by almost seven times in inflation-
adjusted figures (Congressional Budget Office, 2010). According 
to the Social Security Advisory Board (2012a), that expansion 
can be traced to several factors in addition to an increase in the 
general population.  
 
One factor has been an increase in the share of lower 
mortality impairments with earlier onset (such as musculoskeletal 
and mental disorders). Applicants with those types of 
 
 " 

	 15
Like the once-dominant dinosaur, the Social Security disability 
program is described by the United States Supreme Court in the 
landmark 1971 case, Richardson v. Perales36 as encompassing “vast 
workings . . .” And, like the dinosaur, the question is one of survival 
or extinction – an issue now in doubt with the disclosure that the 
disability insurance benefits (DIB) program is insolvent, destined to 
exhaust the Title II disability trust fund in 2016, with little or no 
action taken by the agency to halt the downward slide.37 
                                                            
impairments tend to enter the program at younger ages and 
remain as beneficiaries for longer periods of time. Id. 
 
Another factor has been an increase in female labor force 
participation. The rapid pace at which women have joined the 
ranks among workers has considerably expanded the pool of 
applicants. Indeed, the gender composition of beneficiaries today 
is much closer to that of the population at large. Id. 
 
A third factor has been an increase in earnings replacement 
rates. Rising income inequality coupled with the average wage 
indexing of benefits has increased the portion of potential 
earnings replaced by DI benefits. Younger low-skilled workers in 
particular have experienced the highest increase in the value of 
DI benefits at a time of reduced demand for their labor. 
Exacerbating the gap between potential earnings and disability 
benefits is a reduction in private health insurance coverage. 
Eventual access to Medicare after 2 years on the DI rolls may 
provide an additional enticement to apply. Id. 
36 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
37 Manchester Testimony, supra note 2. Joyce Manchester made plain the 
impending crisis now facing the Social Security disability program:  “Since 2009, 
the program has . . . pa[id] out more annual benefits than it receive[d]” in dedicated 
revenues.  These revenues come primarily from the Social Security payroll tax.  In 
2012, “[t]otal [Disability Insurance (DI)] expenditures were $135 billion,” or 0.87 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), while the program’s dedicated tax 
revenues totaled $102 billion, or 0.65 percent of GDP.  In 2023, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) projects the program’s spending will be 0.82 percent of GDP, 
and dedicated tax revenues will be 0.66 percent of GDP.  The CBO further projects 
that “the DI Trust fund will be exhausted in 2016, nearly 20 years before the 
projected exhaustion of the [Social Security’s Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
(OASI)] trust fund for the Social Security retirement program.” Jeffrey S. Wolfe & 
Dale ing, Through the Disability Looking Glass: A Considered Response to 
Professor Pashler’s Wild Social Security Hare, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 523, 527 
(2014) (Manchester Testimony, supra note 2). 
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Overall, the numbers are telling.  “Total DI [Disability Insurance] 
expenditures were $135 billion,” or 0.87% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2012, while the program’s dedicated tax revenues totaled 
only $102 billion, or 0.65% of GDP.38  In other words, the system is 
now paying out more in disability benefits than it is taking in, in tax 
revenues.  See, Figure 3.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projects that the Disability Insurance trust fund will be ‘in the red’ in 
2016, approximately 20 years before the projected end of Social 
Security’s Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund, 
which pays for the Social Security retirement program.39 
 
Figure 3 
 
Source:  Congressional Budget Office40 
 
[T]he Board of Trustees of the Social Security Trust Funds, in its 
2013 Annual Report, projected that the reserves in the DI Trust Fund, 
which have declined since 2009, will continue . . .to be depleted in 
2016. At that time, continuing income to the DI Trust Fund would be 
                                                            
38 The Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Social Security H. Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (March 14, 2013), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43995_DI-
Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Manchester Hearings] (testimony of Joyce Manchester, 
Chief, Long-Term Analysis Unit). 
39 Id. 
40 Report: The 2013 Long-Term Projections for Social Security: Additional 
Information, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,(December 17, 2013),  
http://cbo.gov/publication/44972. 
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sufficient to pay only 80 percent of scheduled DI benefits.  Absent an 
act of Congress, the Social Security Act does not permit further 
funding or allow SSA to make benefit payments from funds other 
than the Trust Funds. Consequently, if the Social Security Trust Fund 
reserves become depleted, current law would effectively prohibit 
SSA from paying full Social Security benefits.41 
 
Figure 4 
 
Source:  Office of Inspector General, Social Security 
Administration 42 
 
The causes are many, but even a cursory statistical review of the 
Title II disability insurance program reveals fundamental issues – 
both procedural and substantive – crying out for resolution.   
That this is so, is evident from recent history.  The General 
Accounting Office (GAO), now, the “Government Accountability 
Office,” has, over a period of years conducted periodic studies of the 
Social Security Administration and its handling of the disability 
appeals caseload.  It notes in 1996 that the “[t]he Social Security 
                                                            
41 The Social Security Administration’s Ability to Prevent and Detect 
Disability Fraud, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.3 (September, 
2014), 
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/testimony/SSA's%20Ability%20to%20Prevent
%20and%20Detect%20Disability%20Fraud_0.pdf.  
42 Id.  
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Administration (SSA) operates the nation’s largest programs 
providing cash benefits to people with severe long-term 
disabilities.”43  The GAO further  observed that, “[d]espite numerous 
studies of SSA’s disability programs and continued agency attempts 
to improve the disability appeals process, between 1985 and 1995, 
OHA’s pending case backlog—the number of appealed cases waiting 
for a decision—grew from 107,000 to 548,000, and case-processing 
time increased from 167 to 350 days.”44 
Given the foregoing, absent change, Adjudicasaurus Rex seems 
destined for extinction, with increasing delays, rising numbers of 
claimants and exhaustion of the DI Trust Fund – the King of 
Administrative Adjudications brought down by the inability to 
effectively address the claims and appeals of literally millions of 
Americans45 in the company of thousands of lawyers and 
representatives.  It is no secret, though not for some reason obvious, 
that Adjudicasaurus Rex’s habitat – the legal landscape – has 
changed, no longer the vacant fields of the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s.   
Of late, Adjudicasaurus Rex’s environment is quite different from 
earlier times – inhabited by a new species – perhaps best termed, 
Velociraptor advocatasaurus – lawyers and representatives – 
abounding in greater numbers, as never before, in an environment 
which did not originally contemplate their presence.  These recently-
arrived new-actors-in-the-system migrated from their traditional 
habitats, seeking new venues wherein they might flourish.  In 
coming, they now endanger Adjudicasaurus Rex, who ponderously 
lumbers, surrounded now by the more numerous and agile 
Advocatasaurus.   
 
                                                            
43 Social Security Disability:  Backlog Reduction Efforts Under Way; 
Significant Challenges Remain, GAO/HEHS-96-87, UNITED STATES GEN 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE (July, 1996), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155557.pdf. 
44 Id.  
45 Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43421.  The CBO observes “[t]he Disability 
Insurance program provided benefits to 8.3 million disabled workers in 2011. By 
2022, CBO projects, the program will provide benefits to over 10 million disabled 
workers and spending on benefits will exceed $190 billion.” Id. 
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IV. ADJUDICASAURUS REX AND THE PRINCIPLES OF EVOLUTION 
 
In speaking to the need for a new system of administrative 
adjudications for Social Security, the system must be recognized for 
what it is.  Social Security’s system of hearings and adjudications is, 
in social-legal terms, a mass social justice welfare system.  That 
label, standing alone, fails to describe the intricate workings of the 
system.  In fact, Social Security’s system of administrative 
adjudications is a highly complex undertaking involving hundreds if 
not thousands of variables.  By its very nature, the number and effect 
of these variables is in constant flux, made all the more difficult with 
the introduction of lawyers and non-lawyer advocates.  The entrance 
of lawyers and non-lawyer advocates fundamentally changes the 
adjudicatory system simply because the behaviors of such actors 
were not factors originally considered when the jurisprudence was 
devised.   
“The original intent of the framers of the Social Security Act in 
their description of administrative decisionmaking – including 
adjudication – is, in the words of Paul Verkuil, made clear “[i]n a 
1940 statement [by] the [Social Security] Board . . . [and describes 
anticipated decisionmaking under the new Social Security Act] . . . in 
terms of ‘simplicity and informality’ as well as ‘accuracy and 
fairness’. . . The decision model proposed by the Social Security 
Board was designed to make an enormously complex program work 
at low cost and with substantial public satisfaction.”46  The goal 
identified is transparency in decisionmaking with sustained public 
approval in meeting the need for clear and timely administrative 
responses.  Unfortunately, the lofty goals of the 1940’s – to meet the 
                                                            
46 Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 
COL. L. REV. 258, 270-71 (1978). 
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needs of a nation poised on the brink of a new age, now lie buried, 
overwhelmed by numbers once not thought possible.”47 
This is not to say there are no regulations that concern 
representatives.  Title 20 Part 404, Code of Federal Regulations 
Section 1740 et seq. generally addresses the conduct of 
representatives (lawyers and non-lawyers alike); but review of the 
overall jurisprudential scheme fails to find those procedural mandates 
and safeguards present in every other Anglo-American judicial 
system.  Indeed, the reasons articulated by the Social Security Board 
in 1940 makes this clear:  the goal was “simplicity and informality” – 
terms not generally associated with lawyers in the context of 
adjudications. 
Examined through the lens of principles of biological evolution 
the following becomes readily apparent.  Evolution occurs in a 
dynamically changing legal environment just as in a changing 
biological environment.  When examining the evolutionary course of 
the dinosaurs, the inability of the dinosaur to adapt signaled the end 
of that age.  The difference here is a question of choice—a choice the 
dinosaurs did not themselves share.  To act, or not in the face of the 
demise of Adjudicasaurus Rex is the singular (albeit, largely 
unappreciated) question facing the American people.  Failure to 
acknowledge the fundamental changes, which now dramatically 
affect the legal milieu, is tantamount to a failure to adapt. 
From an evolutionary perspective, that Adjudicasurus Rex is to be 
a victim of the very environment from which he springs is no 
accident of circumstance.  Paleontologists note the critical role of 
environment in species survival:  “the strongest predictive factors of 
extinction . . . were both the percentage of a genus's habitat that was 
lost when the sea level dropped and a genus's ability to tolerate 
broader ranges of temperatures.  Groups that lost large portions of 
their habitat as ice sheets grew and sea levels fell, and those that had 
always been confined to warm tropical waters, were most likely to go 
extinct as a result of the rapid climate change.48  Modern theory goes 
                                                            
47 Jeffrey S. Wolfe, Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications, 64 
ADMIN. L. REV. 379, 383-84 (2012). 
48 Kevin Laland, Tobias Uller, Marc Feldman, et al, Does Evolutionary Theory 
Need A Rethink?, NATURE (October 8, 2014), http://www.nature.com/news/does-
evolutionary-theory-need-a-rethink-1.16080. 
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further, proposing extended evolutionary synthesis (EES), postulating 
that:   
“[O]rganisms are constructed in development, not simply 
‘programmed’ to develop by genes. Living things do not evolve to fit 
into pre-existing environments, but co-construct and coevolve with 
their environments, in the process changing the structure of 
ecosystems.” 49  
 Such is the circumstance now facing Adjudicasaurus Rex.  Had 
he evolved in response to changing environmental conditions, he 
would have not only adapted, but by virtue of his own change, would 
have effected yet further adaptation in the legal environment itself.  
Put simply, in the manifestation of his own adaptive response, he too 
becomes an agent of change.  This concept – of elements within a 
system seen as exerting a systemic contributory influence affecting 
the very nature of the system itself—is not new.   Professor Manfred 
Laublicher, Ph.D., of the Laubichler Lab, within the School of Life 
Sciences at Arizona State University, studies “the theory of Complex 
Adaptive Systems (CAS).”50  He writes: 
CAS [Complex Adaptive Systems] can be found across many 
different areas (from living and social to economical and 
                                                            
49 Id.(emphasis added). 
50 Manfred Laublicher, Theory of Developmental Evolution and Complex 
Adaptive Systems, THE LAUBLICHER LAB, DEVELOPMENTAL EVOLUTION ARIZONA 
STATE UNIVERSITY, http://devo-evo.lab.asu.edu/?q=theory (last visited May 2, 
2015).  He notes further: 
As a consequence of the numbers of agents and dynamics of 
CAS, their behaviors play out in an interactive space that has a 
very high number of dimensions and degrees of freedom. Until 
recently, systems of such high dimensionality were not tractable 
to human understanding, but recent advances in computation and 
modeling of CAS are creating the tools to manage, mine and 
manipulate the vast amount of data needed to describe such high 
dimensionalities. All efforts to characterize and understand CAS 
include advanced computational sciences and modeling to 
capture systems-based multidimensionality and new, responsive 
models and constructs, for experimental analysis. Although a 
single prescriptive statement that embraces all categories of CAS 
is difficult, it is increasingly possible to think about (and model) 
their fundamental shared properties; complexity, robustness and 
adaption.   
Id. 
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technological systems) and are variable in form. Therefore, they are 
best captured by identifying the common features that describe their 
essential elements and convergent behaviors. CAS comprise many 
“agents” that exhibit independent properties and behaviors but work 
together to produce emergent properties that cannot be predicted by 
isolated understanding of these interacting agents/components.51     
“One of the defining features of CAS, whether natural, 
technological, economic, social/cultural or biological, is that they are 
in large measure the product of adaptive co-evolution with their 
environment.”52  Despite an adjudicatory structure described by a 
complex system of disability laws, regulations and court rulings, 
literally affecting millions of Americans, Adjudicasaurus Rex – the 
disability adjudicative system, has neither evolved nor adapted to the 
changing legal environment.  In this system, the theory of Complex 
Adaptive Systems postulates an evolutionary adaptation in response to 
changes in the legal landscape, which for the adjudicative system, is 
a primary integral element.  Here, there has been little or no 
adaptation to the rising presence of Velociraptor advocatasaurus – 
lawyers and representatives – and the resulting increase in numbers 
of claims and Requests for Hearings.  
 
 
 
V. TWO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES NOW REQUIRE ADAPTATION 
 
Two critical evolutionary milestones mark now-evident changes 
to the disability legal landscape, each adversely affecting 
Adjudicasaurus Rex as a result of his inability to adapt.  These 
include high rates of growth, marked both by rising numbers of 
disability claims and increasing numbers of Requests for Hearings 
before an Administrative Law Judge; as well as greater numbers of 
attorneys and non-attorney advocates.   
 
                                                            
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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A. Rising Numbers of Claims 
 
First, the evolving disability legal environment is characterized 
by a high rate of growth over a relatively short period of time.  This 
has resulted in a national “backlog” which the system is unable to 
resolve – no real mechanisms in place to resolve pending claims 
absent the supposed “simple” and “informal” decisionmaking process 
of the 1940’s – essentially holding hearings in the vast majority of all 
pending claims.  This is evident not only from statistical data (see, 
Figure 2, supra), but in two key Supreme Court decisions.  In 1971, 
the United States Supreme Court in Richardson v. Perales53 
described as “vast workings,” the administrative adjudicative and 
appeals system statutorily a part of the Social Security Disability 
program,54 with “over 20,000 disability claim[s\ hearings annually. . 
.”55  A short twelve years later, in 1983, the Court in Heckler v. 
Campbell observed that “[t]he Social Security hearing system is 
                                                            
53 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 at n. 6 (1971). 
54 See 42 U.S.C. §405(a)(1), providing in-part: 
The Commissioner of Social Security is directed to make 
findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any individual 
applying for a payment under this title . . . Upon request by any 
such individual . . . who makes a showing in writing that his or 
her rights may be prejudiced by any decision the Commissioner 
of Social Security has rendered, the Commissioner shall give 
such applicant and such other individual reasonable notice and 
opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision, and, if a 
hearing is held, shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the 
hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s findings 
of fact and such decision . . . The Commissioner of Social 
Security is further authorized, on the Commissioner’s own 
motion, to hold such hearings and to conduct such investigations 
and other proceedings as the Commissioner may deem necessary 
or proper for the administration of this title. In the course of any 
hearing, investigation, or other proceeding, the Commissioner 
may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and 
receive evidence. Evidence may be received at any hearing 
before the Commissioner of Social Security even though 
inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to court 
procedure. 
Id. 
55 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 406. 
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‘probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world.’"56  
The Court went on to note “[a]pproximately 2.3 million claims for 
disability benefits were filed in fiscal year 1981. . . More than a 
quarter of a million of these claims required a hearing before an 
administrative law judge.”57  This number now exceeds 800,000 
annual hearings before administrative law judges. 
Figure 2 depicts the growth in numbers of pending hearings from 
just 2008 to the present.  In 2014 the number of pending hearings 
edged over the million case mark, described as the “backlog,”58 
exceeding the admitted capacity of 400,00 hearings by more than two 
times.  Today, the number of pending disability appeals awaiting 
hearing far exceeds the once-described “vast” totals of 1971, 
swamping an adjudicatory system whose now antiquated 
jurisprudence renders it unable to effectively address such volumes.   
                                                            
56 Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, n. 2 (1983) (citing, J. MASHAW, C. 
GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL, & M. CARROW, SOCIAL 
SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS XI (1978)). 
57 Id., (citing SOCIAL SECURITY ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 1981, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,32, 35, 38 
(1982)).  
58 Social Security Disability: Better Planning, Management, and Evaluation 
Could Help Address Backlogs GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE  (December, 2007), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0840.pdf.  The GAO notes that the Social Security 
Administration defines a ‘backlog’ as those cases pending beyond an optimal 
projected number at the end of a given fiscal year.  The GAO describes the Social 
Security Administration’s definition of a ‘backlogged’ case as follows: 
 
SSA measures its claims processing performance at each 
level of the process in terms of the number of claims pending 
each year and the time it takes to issue a decision. Since 1999, 
the agency has used a relative measure to determine the backlog 
by considering how many cases should optimally be pending at 
year-end. This relative measure is referred to as “target pending” 
and is set for each level of the disability process with the 
exception of the reconsideration level. SSA’s target pending is 
400,000 for claims at the initial stage and 300,000 and 40,000 for 
the hearings and Appeals Council stages, respectively.  The 
number of pending claims at year-end that exceed these numbers 
represents the backlog. 
Id. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
B. Rising Numbers of Attorneys and Non-Attorney Advocates 
 
The second environmental element, now present in greater 
numbers than ever before, is the rising presence of lawyers and non-
lawyer advocates.  In a system originally designed to be “informal” 
in its jurisprudence, vesting the judge with the primary duty of 
inquiry, today’s legal environment has overwhelmed the adjudicatory 
system.   
In the Anglo-American adversarial system of justice, the parties 
are “active”—it is they, the parties—who present the evidence they 
wish the decisionmaker to consider.  The decisionmaker, judge and 
jury, are neutral and “passive”—that is, neither the judge nor the jury 
are sources of evidence.  There is no independent duty of inquiry to 
ensure the record is adequately developed.  In the adversarial system, 
a poor record will result in a loss.  Not so under Social Security’s 
quasi-inquisitorial system.  A poorly developed record may give rise 
to an appeal by the claimant, asserting the judge failed to do all that 
he or she should have done to ensure the record is adequately 
developed.  In the adversarial system, it is the parties who must meet 
their respective burdens of proof going forward.  There is no 
 
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evidentiary burden upon the judge.  qHer role is to ensure due 
process—ensuring a fundamentally fair, timely and just proceeding is 
had. In the words of one writer, two essential values frame the 
adversarial system; 
An adversary system of adjudication, as generally defined, has 
two essential elements.  First, the parties themselves are responsible 
for gathering and presenting evidence and arguments on behalf of 
their positions.  Second, the decisionmaker knows nothing of the 
litigation until the trial, when the parties present their neatly 
packaged cases to him.  These elements are related to some of the 
elements of fair adjudication identified above.59   
Social Security’s version of an inquisitorial system requires the 
judge “look fully into the issues,”60 donning “Three Hats”: one in 
which she searches and gathers the evidence favorable to the 
claimant; then dons the second hat and searches for the evidence 
favorable to the government; finally deciding the case by returning to 
the middle with the neutral hat supposedly firmly in place.61  
Professor Sward echoes the “active” role of the inquisitorial judge as 
directing the course of evidentiary production, effectively the reverse 
of the adversarial system: 
Inquisitorial adjudication is generally cast as the opposite of 
adversarial adjudication.  Thus, two essential elements of 
inquisitorial adjudication are: first, that the judge is primarily 
responsible for supervising the gathering of evidence necessary to 
resolve the issue; and, second, that the decisionmaker is not, 
therefore, merely a receptor for information at a neatly packaged 
trial, but is, instead, an active participant.  In practice, an inquisitorial 
"trial" such as is found in continental Europe may continue as a series 
of hearings for several months as the judge considers what further 
information he might need to resolve the dispute.62 
This stands in stark contrast to traditional American jurisprudence 
where it is the parties who are responsible for development of the 
evidence.  More significantly, because the Social Security hearings 
outcome is judge-driven, requiring the judge be an “active” 
                                                            
59 Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary 
System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 312 (1989). 
60 20 C.F.R. Part 404 §944. 
61 See, supra note 12. 
62 Sward, supra note 54 at 313-14. 
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participant in the development of the evidentiary record, she must, in 
effect, convene every case.  There is no mechanism, which affects 
significant numbers of claims, to render decisions early, or, without a 
full hearing, as there is no “other party” with whom claimant’s 
counsel may confer.  Thus, the “simple” and “informal” vision of the 
1940 Social Security Board now continues, hobbling the system, 
causing backlogs, because the inherent jurisprudence, once thought 
ideal for an entitlements program in which few persons were 
represented, now stands stymied by overwhelming numbers, with no 
mechanism in place other than that which has been in place since the 
earliest beginning. 
  Professor Verkuil notes that the vision for Social Security 
specifically did not include a decisionmaking process akin to that in 
the courts.  Instead, it was envisioned that an “administrator” would 
serve as an agent for the public, resolving questions of entitlement 
consistent with the public goals of the program: 
As guidelines for the legion of social security decisionmakers 
who had to adjudicate eligibility and entitlement to the old-age and 
survivors insurance program (and as time went on, the disability 
program), the Social Security Board offered a new rationale for the 
role of the decisionmaker in the hearing process.  In a 1940 
statement, the Board discussed the values to be achieved in an 
administrative hearing in terms of “simplicity and informality” as 
well as “accuracy and fairness.”  It referred to a social security 
decisionmaker as a “referee” or “social agent.”63  This concept of the 
administrator as an agent for the public (working to ensure that the 
program goals are fulfilled) is different from the roles assigned to the 
common-law judge.  The social security “referee” thus emerges with 
a role that is independent of the judicial one . . . The decision model 
proposed by the Social Security Board was designed to make an 
enormously complex program work at low cost and with substantial 
public satisfaction.64 
                                                            
63 In the original, the footnote is note 55, which reads: 
See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD 1940 REPORT, MONOGRAPH OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, Pt. 
3, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong. 1st, Sess. 37, 46 app. (1941). 
64 Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 
COL. L. REV. 258, 270-71 (1978).  
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This heritage continues within today’s Social Security 
bureaucracy, which adopts terms such as “programmatic integrity” or 
“policy compliant,” staunchly adhering to an outdated hybrid-
inquisitorial system despite repeated and ongoing delay and rising 
costs.  
The seeming innocuous fact that the percentage of claimants now 
represented by counsel is far greater than when Adjudicasaurus Rex 
first roamed65 is not so innocuous in its effect.  The “informal,” “non-
adversarial” climate once allowed the seeming beneficent Hearing 
Examiner, now, administrative law judge, to “wear Three Hats,” with 
relative ease, adopting the role of public administrator—a role in 
which it was envisioned that most persons would accept the result, 
the government acting as “super parent:” 
Here lies the essence of the current jurisprudence.  It is an 
agency-centric model adopting a 1930’s worldview powered by a 
1950’s caretaker mentality in which the role of counsel is minimized 
in favor of a strong agency decisionmaker, empowered to ensure the 
‘right result’ is reached.  It evokes an image of the government 
reminiscent of the State in juvenile cases – the State as parens 
patriae – or super-parent.  More cogently, it accepts as a procedural 
mandate the public policy underlying the Social Security Act, 
expressed most plainly at 20 C.F.R. §404.508 (which deals with 
waiver of an overpayment where “adjustment or recovery will defeat 
the purpose of Title II”).  That section provides, in-part, that to defeat 
the purpose of “benefits under this title” means “to deprive a person 
of income required for ordinary and necessary living expenses.”66  
That is to say, the public policy underlying the Social Security Act is 
to provide daily maintenance and sustenance for those unable to 
                                                            
65 See Robert G. Dixon, The Welfare State and Mass Justice:  A Warning from 
the Social Security Disability Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681, 693 (September 
1972), who writes:  
In 1964-65 [sic], attorneys represented claimants in 
approximately 17-18% of the hearings.  In the first six months of 
1971, the number approached 21-23%.  Figures were obtained 
from Edward L. Binder, Technical Advisor, Bureau of Disability 
Insurance, SSA-Baltimore Headquarters, August, 1971.  The 
right to retained counsel is available at prior decisional stages, 
but cases in which it is exercise is rare. 
Id.  
66 20 C.F.R. §404.508(a).  
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provide for themselves.  The agency becomes the personified 
intention of the government to provide for those who cannot provide 
for themselves – in real terms, a ‘super parent.’” (Citations 
omitted).67 
Defining the Social Security decisionmaker (formerly the 
Hearing Examiner and now the Administrative Law Judge) as one 
who looks out for the welfare of the claimant by ensuring the record 
is fully developed by the wearing of “Three Hats” is a direct 
expression of this unique procedural mandate.  In a jurisprudence 
described as “non-adversarial” where the government chooses not to 
appear; and instead imbues the decisionmaker with its and the 
claimant’s responsibilities to present evidence, there can be little 
doubt but that the intended role of the decisionmaker is not so much 
that of a neutral as it is agency facilitator or “super parent”– a 
uniquely different role from that of “judge” in the traditional Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence.68 
The presence in great numbers of lawyers and non-lawyer 
advocates changed all this.   
The introduction of Velociraptor advocatasaurus or lawyers, 
trained in the adversarial system of justice, upends the “Three Hat” 
jurisprudence.  With the advent of widespread representation, 
Adjudicasaurus Rex no longer operates in the same legal 
environment; yet, he has not adapted.  The hearings process requires 
that a claimant file a Request for Hearing by Administrative Law 
Judge69 within 60 days of an adverse determination following 
reconsideration.70  Hearings are closed to the public, on the record,71 
                                                            
67 Jeffrey S. Wolfe, Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications, 64 
ADMIN. L. REV. 379, 384 (2012). 
68 Id.  
69 SOC. SEC. ADMINI. FORM HA-501-U5 (01-2015) ef (01-2015). 
70 20 C.F.R. §404.933 (2014). 
71 42 U.S.C. §405(g) provides for review by the federal courts of any decision 
reached by the Commissioner of Social Security, and further provides that “[a]s 
part of the Commissioner’s answer [in response to the claimant’s appeal to the 
court] the Commissioner of Social Security shall file a certified copy of the 
transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and 
decision complained of are based.” Id. This has been interpreted to require an “on-
the-record” proceeding for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act.  See, 
e.g., for a further discussion on the applicability of the Administrative Procedure 
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before an administrative law judge, akin to a “bench trial,”72 and are 
described by current regulation as “nonadversarial.”73  Appeals from 
                                                            
Act to Social Security adjudications, Jeffrey S. Wolfe, Will You Make that 
Commitment in Writing?  The APA, ALJs and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 203 (2002). 
72 A “bench trial” is a type of trial in which there is no jury.  The judge must 
determine both questions of law and questions of fact.  See Definitions, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER 
http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe!openform&nav=menu1&page=/fe
deral/courts.nsf/page/800; See e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996). 
73 20 C.F.R. §404.900 describes generally the appeals process as well as the 
jurisprudence of SSA’s decision-making process: 
 
 § 404.900   Introduction. 
  (a) Explanation of the administrative review process. This subpart explains 
the procedures we follow in determining your rights under title II of the Social 
Security Act. The regulations describe the process of administrative review and 
explain your right to judicial review after you have taken all the necessary 
administrative steps. These procedures apply also to persons claiming certain 
benefits under title XVIII of the Act (Medicare); see 42 CFR 405.701(c). The 
administrative review process consists of several steps, which usually must be 
requested within certain time periods and in the following order: 
  (1) Initial determination. This is a determination we make about your 
entitlement or your continuing entitlement to benefits or about any other matter, as 
discussed in §404.902, that gives you a right to further review. 
  (2) Reconsideration. If you are dissatisfied with an initial determination, you 
may ask us to reconsider it. 
  (3) Hearing before an administrative law judge. If you are dissatisfied with 
the reconsideration determination, you may request a hearing before an 
administrative law judge. 
  (4) Appeals Council review. If you are dissatisfied with the decision of the 
administrative law judge, you may request that the Appeals Council review the 
decision. 
  (5) Federal court review. When you have completed the steps of the 
administrative review process listed in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this 
section, we will have made our final decision. If you are dissatisfied with our final 
decision, you may request judicial review by filing an action in a Federal district 
court. 
  (6) Expedited appeals process. At some time after your initial determination 
has been reviewed, if you have no dispute with our findings of fact and our 
application and interpretation of the controlling laws, but you believe that a part of 
the law is unconstitutional, you may use the expedited appeals process. This 
process permits you to go directly to a Federal district court so that the 
constitutional issue may be resolved. 
  (b) Nature of the administrative review process. In making a determination or 
decision in your case, we conduct the administrative review process in an informal, 
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a judge’s decision may be made to the Appeals Council of the Social 
Security Administration, and if affirmed, becomes the final decision 
of the Commissioner of Social Security.  At no point in this process 
does the Social Security Administration make an appearance.  Thus, 
at no point, does claimant’s counsel have any opportunity to 
negotiate an outcome short of hearing.  In effect, the absence of the 
Social Security Administration as a party from the hearings process 
signals the inability of the agency to reach any result in a pending 
claim short of hearing, mandating a hearing for each claim made, 
exacerbating the hearings backlog.  Complicating the process, the 
Appeals Council may engage in “own motion review,” examining a 
decision even if no appeal has been taken.74  A final decision of the 
Commissioner is appealable to the United States courts for review 
under Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).75    
Evidence of the 1940’s worldview remains apparent within the 
regulatory scheme, largely in the form of weak procedural 
mechanisms.  Consider Title 20 C.F.R. Part 404 § 935, styled, 
“SUBMITTING EVIDENCE PRIOR TO A HEARING BEFORE AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE.”  Section 935 purports to govern that 
which stands at the heart of every disability adjudication:  submission 
                                                            
nonadversary manner. In each step of the review process, you may present any 
information you feel is helpful to your case. Subject to the limitations on Appeals 
Council consideration of additional evidence (see §§404.970(b) and 404.976(b)), 
we will consider at each step of the review process any information you present as 
well as all the information in our records. You may present the information 
yourself or have someone represent you, including an attorney. If you are 
dissatisfied with our decision in the review process, but do not take the next step 
within the stated time period, you will lose your right to further administrative 
review and your right to judicial review, unless you can show us that there was 
good cause for your failure to make a timely request for review.  [45 FR 52081, 
Aug. 5, 1980, as amended at 51 FR 300, Jan 3, 1986; 51 FR 8808, Mar. 14, 1986; 
52 FR 4004, Feb. 9, 1987]. 
74 See 20 C.F.R. Part 404 §969(a), which provides: 
General. Anytime within 60 days after the date of a decision 
or dismissal that is subject to review under this section, the 
Appeals Council may decide on its own motion to review the 
action that was taken in your case. We may refer your case to the 
Appeals Council for it to consider reviewing under this authority. 
Id. 
75 See, supra note 4. 
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of the objective medical and other evidence.  The regulation rather 
weakly provides: 
If possible, the evidence or a summary of evidence you wish to 
have considered at the hearing should be submitted to the 
administrative law judge with the request for hearing or within 10 
days after filing the request. Each party shall make every effort to be 
sure that all material evidence is received by the administrative law 
judge or is available at the time and place set for the hearing.76 
 Section 935 provides no certitude, sets no deadlines, gives no 
authority to the judge to set any timeframe within which to produce 
the requisite evidence, and essentially leaves, without any means of 
enforcement, the submission of evidence entirely to counsel; whose 
fee increases the greater the gap between the alleged onset date and 
the date of decision.  This deficit is compounded by Section 944, 
which requires the judge look “fully into the issues,” interpreted as 
creating an affirmative duty of inquiry,77 even though no mechanisms 
exist to require counsel to, in fact, produce such evidence.  Indeed, 
review of the regulatory scheme reveals few deadlines; and while the 
judge presides over the course of the hearing, she has few, if any 
procedural mechanisms, which allow her to expedite the hearing 
process.78  Even setting the hearing date does not guarantee an 
expeditious result, as there is no regulatory mechanism to close the 
record after hearing.         
                                                            
76 20 C.F.R. Part 404 § 935. 
77 Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000). 
78 For example, section 950(d)(2) provides for a request to issue a subpoena 
not later than five (5) days before a scheduled hearing.  As a pragmatic matter the 
likelihood of a return on the subpoena within such a short period is slim; with the 
attendant result being further delay after the hearing, with the possibility of a 
supplemental hearing to address the evidence submitted is response to the 
subpoena.  Few other regulations set deadlines.  Notice of hearing is governed by 
Section 938(a) and provides for at least 20 days’ notice.  Following a failure to 
appear at the time and place of the hearing, Section 957(b)(2)(ii) provides that the 
administrative law judge is to give the claimant notice within ten (10) days to show 
cause for the non-appearance.  This has been interpreted to allow the claimant ten 
(10) days to respond.  Section 957(c)(4) provides a sixty (60) day window for any 
other person adversely affected by the dismissal to make a showing of good cause.  
Section 961 provides that a prehearing conference may be held at the request of a 
party or at the judge’s behest upon seven (7) days’ notice.  Section 968 provides for 
appeal to the Appeals Council within sixty (60) days after the date of notice of a 
decision or dismissal. 
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The Social Security Administration has long known of these 
issues and despite the mounting body of evidence, has been 
manifestly ineffective in addressing, much less resolving the growing 
number of disability appeals that now form what is termed “the 
backlog.”  
Adjudicasaurus Rex seems destined to follow the paths of his 
reptilian cousins. 
 
  
VI. WHAT IF, REVISITED 
 
As optimistic as bureaucratic predictions of success often are, 
they have not, in this instance, been accurate regarding the growing 
backlog.  Reports from the GAO, the Government’s agency 
watchdog, tell the tale:
• In 1999, the GAO observed that “SSA’s disability claims 
process, which has not changed fundamentally in over 40 years, is 
inherently complex and fragmented.”79  
• Some four years later, the GAO found that despite widespread 
understanding of coming insolvency, little had been done, saying, 
“Our January 2001 report . . . identified the long-term solvency and 
sustainability of the social security system as one of the most urgent 
policy challenges facing the nation and SSA . . . However, as the time 
approaches when Social Security’s expenditures will exceed its 
income, there is still no consensus on a plan for reforming the social 
security system.”80 
• In 2005 the status quo remained as the GAO again recounted 
the impending crisis marked by expenditures in disability payments 
which had at that point quadrupled between 1982 and 2002.  The 
GAO again observed that while “the number of disabled workers 
                                                            
79 SSA Disability Redesign: Actions Needed to Enhance Future Progress, 
GAO/HEHS-99-25, UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (March, 1999), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/156504.pdf. 
80 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security 
Administration, GAO-03-117 UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (Jan., 
2003), http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/237056.html 
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receiving benefits under SSA’s Disability Insurance (DI) program 
doubled from 2.6 million to 5.5 million . . . payments quadrupled 
from about $14.8 billion to $60 billion. Moreover, these disability 
programs are poised to grow even more as baby boomers reach their 
disability-prone years.”81 (Emphasis added). 
• In 2005 the GAO in 2005 also stated that “[o]ver the past 
several years, GAO, in reporting that the largest federal disability 
programs were mired in outdated concepts of disability, has 
identified the need to reexamine and transform these programs to 
better position the government to meet the challenges and 
expectations of the 21st century.”  (Emphasis added).82  
• By fiscal year 2006, cases on appeal to Social Security 
administrative law judges “rose dramatically [from 12,000 cases in 
1999] to over 415,000 claims by the close of fiscal year 2006 and 
constituted about 72 percent of all SSA backlogged claims that 
year.”83 
• “Since September 2009, SSA has reported progress toward 
eliminating its hearings-level backlog—defined as reducing the 
number of pending cases to SSA’s target of 466,000.”84   
• “In March 2010, SSA reported that pending cases were down to 
697,437 from 760,000 in fiscal year 2008.”85 
While SSA claims to be successful in reducing backlogged cases, 
the raw numbers tell a different story – one of a rising backlog, with 
a progression in 2006 of 415,000 pending appeals to 466,000 in 2009 
and 697,000 in 2010.  In 2007, the GAO pointedly observes that 
“management weakness as evidenced by a number of initiatives that 
were not successfully implemented have limited SSA’s ability to 
                                                            
81 Federal Disability Assistance: Wide Array of Programs Needs to be 
Examined in Light of 21st Century Challenges, GAO-05-626, UNITED STATES GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE (June, 2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05626.pdf. 
82 Id. at 21. 
83 Social Security Disability: Better Planning, Management, and Evaluation 
Could Help Address Backlogs, GAO-08-40, UNITED STATES GEN. 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Dec., 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0840.pdf. 
[hereinafter GAO-08-40] 
84 Id. 
85 Social Security Disability: Management of Disability Claims Workload Will 
Require Comprehensive Planning UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-10-667T (April 27, 2010), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/124523.pdf. 
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remedy the backlog.”86  The GAO report continues, noting that 
“[s]everal initiatives introduced by SSA in the last 10 years to 
improve processing times and eliminate backlogged claims have, 
because of their complexity and poor execution, actually added to the 
problem. For example, the “Hearings Process Improvement” 
initiative implemented in fiscal year 2000 significantly increased the 
days it took to adjudicate a hearings claim and exacerbated the 
backlog after the agency had substantially reduced it.”87 
The problems are not new.  As early as 1970 concern was being 
voiced that the system was in trouble.  “The total volume of work has 
been onerous and has tended to increase each year.  For fiscal year 
1970 . . . almost 800,000 worker disability claims were filed in 
district offices . . . across the nation; 1971 claims exceeded this 
number by almost 150,000.” 88  The writer accurately warns against a 
rising caseload: 
Although the number of disability claims subject to 
administrative adjudication and court litigation has been high, the 
current volume may prove to be only the warning tip of the iceberg. 
If, in addition to the black lung legislation, Congress enacts the 
extensive welfare reforms embodied in H.R. 1, the Social Security 
Amendments of 1972, the combined effect of these two plans, plus 
the natural growth rate in the original disability program, will yield 
further substantial increases in the number of disability claims filed 
with the SAA.89 
Dixon levels criticism of the adjudicatory process, predicting 
accurately its future course: 
Thus, in the interest of fairness and equality, hearings and appeals 
are instituted, and the welfare recipient, in his economic life, almost 
unavoidably tends to become a “federal case.”  A level of fairness, 
equality of treatment, and “correctness” of decision which would be 
unmanageable in the private sphere is sought – indeed, is 
constitutionally mandated because “state action” is involved.  The 
long range question is at what point of volume and complexity a high 
level of decisional formality and review of each resource allocation 
                                                            
86 GAO-08-40, supra note 83 at 3. 
87 Id. 
88 Robert G. Dixon, The Welfare State and Mass Justice:  A Warning from the 
Social Security Disability Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681, 683 (1972). 
89 Id. at 685. 
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determination becomes unworkable in the welfare system because 
decisions on claims cannot be produced with sufficient speed, 
fairness and consistency. 
Against this backdrop, and facing the insolvency of the Disability 
Insurance Program in 2016, the Acting Commissioner of the Social 
Security Administration, appeared before the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform on June 11, 2014.90  As 
recounted in-part, above, no specific ideas were voiced apart from 
increasing FICA withholding or linking the DIB Trust Fund with the 
Retirement Fund; neither idea well received.   
Assume a different dialogue than that originally had with the 
Committee Chair, Mr. Darrell Issa (D-California), then U.S. 
Representative Mr. James Lankford (R-Oklahoma)91 and Mr. Jim 
Jordan (D-Ohio).  What if there was a dialogue with a hypothetical 
Commissioner of Social Security, this time about saving 
Adjudicasaurus Rex?  
VII. REWINDING THE CLOCK 
 
Unleash H.G. Wells and consider the words of Rod Serling, 
“You're traveling through another dimension, a dimension not only of 
sight and sound but of mind; a journey into a wondrous land whose 
boundaries are that of imagination. Your next stop...the Twilight 
Zone.”92 
What could have been discussed between Chairman Issa and the 
Commissioner?  Consider a hypothetical conversation between 
Chairman Issa, the members of the House Committee on Government 
Oversight and Reform, and a hypothetical Commissioner of Social 
Security. 
 
                                                            
90 Dixon, supra note 60 at 687. 
91 Mr. Lankford has since been elected to the United States Senate, as junior 
Senator from the State of Oklahoma. 
92 Rod Serling’s opening monolog 1961-1962 Seasons, The Twilight Zone, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Twilight_Zone_(1959_TV_series). 
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Framing the Issues  
 
Chairman Issa:   
Do you believe that Congress needs to give greater authority, not 
greater money, greater authority, to fire, to reform, to review if you 
are in fact going to represent the American People’s best interest of 
their tax dollars?93 
 
The Commissioner:94 
We agree that the best interests of the American people lie in 
reforming the current system of disability assessment and appeal.  By 
this, I mean we must re-examine what it means to be “disabled” in 
the year 2016.  This examination embraces a substantive review of 
the criteria by which one is adjudicated “disabled.”  It also means 
that we must bring our current system of disability appeals into the 
21st Century.  It is no longer 1956.  Unlike the circumstances extant 
in those bygone years, more than 80% of all claimants are now 
represented by either attorneys or certified non-lawyer 
representatives.  Television advertisements crisscross the airways as 
national disability firms have sprung into being, seeking to take 
advantage of a growing disability economic infrastructure embracing 
some $200 billion annually.95 This represents more than 5 million 
Title II disability insurance (DI), and Title XVI supplemental security 
income (SSI) claimants annually filing for such benefits in 2013 
alone.96   
 
                                                            
93 See supra, note 7.   
94 The dialogue set forth in this and in succeeding paragraphs is solely a 
fictional creation of the author and not the then-Acting Commissioner or any other 
official within the Social Security Administration. 
95 Avik Roy, How Americans Game the $200 Billion-a-Year ‘Disability 
Industrial Complex, FORBES (April 8, 2013),  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/04/08/how-americans-game-the-
200-billion-a-year-disability-industrial-complex/.   
96 The following “Workload” chart prepared by the Social Security 
Administration, Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2014, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., 4, 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2014/fast_facts14.pdf, shows 
more than 5 million DI and SSI disability claims combined: 
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 Chairman Issa:97 
There is still the issue, represented by the actions of some 185 
administrative law judges, who decide appeals, reversing underlying 
administrative denials at rates of 85% or greater.  Clearly, these 
judges who represent a little over 10% of sitting administrative law 
judges in Social Security’s Office of Disability Adjudication and 
Review, do not represent the majority, and yet should we not take 
steps to ensure against such outliers?98  Should we not impose some 
sort of control over decision-making gone awry and thereby seek to 
protect the American people from actions, which imperil the 
Disability Insurance fund? 
 
The Commissioner: 
Mr. Chairman, you raise several issues which have no simple 
answer.  Let me address each in turn.  First, the agency has been 
accused of encouraging decisionmaking by administrative law 
judges, which serve to “pay down the backlog.”99  The most 
egregious example of this is the 2011 West Virginia action.  My 
review of the circumstances surrounding the 2011 West Virginia 
incident leads me to conclude that there are instances wherein the 
agency should have taken action more expeditiously to curb judicial 
activity which contravened established agency policy, particularly as 
                                                            
 
Workload, Fiscal Year 2013 (in millions) 
       Type of filing           Number 
       OASI claims             5.0 
       DI claims                 3.2 
       SSI applications       2.6 
 
97 The dialogue set forth in this and in succeeding paragraphs is solely a 
fictional creation of the author and not Chairman Issa.  
98 The Social Security Administration’s Review of Administrative Law Judges’ 
Decisions, A-07-12-21234, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 
(March, 2012), http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-07-12-
21234.pdf. 
99 See, e.g., Stephen Ohlemacher, Judges Tell Lawmakers They are Urged to 
Approve Social Security Disability Claims, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 27, 
2013),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judges-tell-lawmakers-they-are-
urged-to-approve-social-security-disability-claims/2013/06/27/ea990a7e-df66-
11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html.  
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regards assignment of cases.  Not to say that I mean we should have 
curbed judicial decision-making under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, nor that we should or could have encouraged any particular 
result in a judicial hearing, but rather that an investigation should 
have been initiated far earlier than was the case.  In this, our critics 
are correct, for the net effect of agency inaction in 2011 was to 
encourage decision-making behavior violative of agency policy 
which otherwise assures a claimant due process of law. 
 
Chairman Issa: 
Without imposing any limit on your response to my earlier 
question, how would such reform be implemented? 
 
The Commissioner: 
Thank you Mr. Chairman.  We need to change our institutional 
culture.  The success of SSA’s mission depends upon our employees.  
There is a time-tested adage in the lessons of naval leadership which 
deserves our attention and, I think, our immediate implementation: 
“Loyalty down begets loyalty up.” 100  We have been guilty of 
tunnel-vision – focused on achieving a results-oriented outcome, 
bound to an outdated adjudicatory process, failing to look first to 
infrastructure reform.  In so doing, I fear we have demanded ‘loyalty 
up’ without the reciprocal expression of ‘loyalty down.’  By this I 
mean, we failed, in a most fundamental way, to respect the 
professionalism, dedication and insight of our employees – and, yes, 
our judges.   
Speaking to the West Virginia incident, my review leads me to 
conclude that local and regional leadership became focused, almost 
to the exclusion of all else, upon resolving the local “backlog.”101  
That meant we looked the other way, endorsing heightened 
decisionmaking  no matter the cost – in that case, disproportionately 
large numbers of decisions by a single judge.  In maintaining a 
numbers-driven focus, we did not hear, nor did we respect, the 
persistent and long-standing warnings of our employees.102  In failing 
                                                            
100 CAPT. MALCOLM E. WOLFE, U.S.N. (RET.), NAVAL LEADERSHIP, 140-41 
(U.S. Naval Institute Press,1959). 
101 See, supra note 53.  
102 60 Minutes, Disability USA, CBS (Oct.10, 2013), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/disability-usa/. 
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to do so, the local and regional chief judges fundamentally forfeited 
their respective leadership roles.  By ignoring the warnings of our 
own employees we erroneously, if all-but-unintentionally, embraced 
the old proverb, ‘silence is golden.’   
West Virginia painfully reminds us that management is not 
leadership, and that good managers must first and foremost be good 
leaders.  In the end, Mr. Chairman, and in answer to your question, 
implementation of needed reform is not simply a matter of continuing 
education or leadership training videos, but instead, begins with 
voicing and adoption of a new corporate message.  The focus of our 
collective activity should, in the first and last instance, always be 
service, not production quotas, numbers or goals.  We should be first 
concerned with the quality of our service to the American people and 
not find our motivation in the wringing of hands over the continuing 
backlog.  If we serve the American people effectively, I am confident 
we will eliminate the hearings backlog.   
To be successful, however, I emphasize again, we must be 
effective, and effective service starts by changing our corporate 
culture, respecting the voices of our employees – and most certainly 
of our judges.  In doing so, we must work toward creation of an 
environment in which leadership, and not management, is the 
lifeblood of our activity.                   
 
Chairman Issa, deferring to Mr. Lankford of Oklahoma:103 
Thank you Mr. Chairman.  I am nonetheless concerned, 
Commissioner, that some 10% of Social Security administrative law 
judges are reversing between 85% and 100% of their assigned 
disability appeals, creating, in a less dramatic fashion, essentially the 
same result found in West Virginia.104  Judges who compromise their 
                                                            
103 The dialogue set forth in this and in succeeding paragraphs is solely a 
fictional creation of the authors and not then-Representative Lankford.  
104 Damian Paletta, Disability Claim Judge has Trouble Saying ‘No,’ THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 19, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704681904576319163605918524
.  who writes: 
The average disability-benefit approval rate among all 
administrative judges is about 60% of cases. But . . . [i]n the first 
half of fiscal 2011, 27 judges awarded benefits 95% of the time, 
not counting those who heard just a handful of cases. More than 
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integrity, who fail to properly implement their sworn duty, and who, 
in so doing, imperil the well-being of the citizenry do not deserve to 
remain in their respective positions.  Surely, Commissioner, there 
must be a solution to this problem?  And, surely, you do not condone 
a reversal rate in which 85% to 100% of appeals are granted, 
resulting in a payment of disability benefits when the average 
reversal rate for the majority of administrative law judges is between 
40% and 60%?  Just as certainly, would you not advocate for a 
change, either in the authority of the agency to discipline or regulate 
judicial decisionmaking; or, even in the elimination of such judges 
altogether? 
 
I yield the floor back to Chairman Issa. 
 
 
 
VIII. A NEW JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The Commissioner: 
Thank you Congressman Lankford.  I appreciate your question, 
not because it may be interpreted by some as implicit permission for 
action to be taken against these judges, and in some way freeing my 
hands politically to do so; but because it highlights critical 
shortcomings in the current system of disability appeals.  Do we need 
federal administrative law judges?  The answer is unequivocally, yes.  
I do not wish that we replace these judges with other decisionmakers 
of lesser standing, for it is important that the American people know, 
understand, and be assured that their interests in this critical arena are 
in the hands of capable professionals.  Our government has entrusted 
these serious decisions to federal administrative law judges -- 
individuals who have been carefully screened, literally chosen from 
                                                            
100 awarded benefits to 90% or more of applicants, according to 
agency statistics.   
Id. 
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among thousands of applicants, and whose credentials rival those of 
their counterparts in the federal judiciary.105  We, as Americans need 
to be able to place our trust, faith and reliance in the professionalism 
of those who serve in this critical role. 
That being said, the current system by which such judges are now 
employed, is flawed.  We should not look to the decisionmaking of 
these few judges, and in so doing, make an argument that the position 
of administrative law judges must change. Neither should we 
conclude that there is somehow a need for greater authority over such 
judges.  Rather, the evidence you cite is indicative of a system whose 
hallmarks, design and structure has been overtaken by the passage of 
time, a result of a fundamental changes in the legal landscape.  It is 
not that administrative law judges are flawed or that they have 
ignored their duty, but rather, I am satisfied from my review, that it is 
the legal landscape of disability appeals that has changed around 
them. The upshot has been an ever-increasing potential for legal 
conundrums, with the sometime contrary result illustrated by the 
statistics you’ve cited.  
Just as the central character (“the Time Traveler”) in H.G. Wells’ 
famous story, The Time Machine, found himself stymied by the 
application of 19th Century conventions in the far future world of the 
Eloi and the Morlocks, so, I suggest, are administrative law judges 
now faced with a much different world than was contemplated when 
the current judicial/adjudicatory infrastructure was designed.  Time 
has passed the current system of disability appeals by.  The result is 
that we now seem to be trying to force a round peg into a square hole.  
The consequent delay in attempting to force-fit the round peg has 
resulted in an ever-growing backlog of disability appeals.  Our 
current system embraces a 1950’s culture whose tenants were formed 
in the legal culture of that era. 
 
Congressman Issa: 
I have asked you to speak plainly here, and I have not hesitated to 
do so myself because of the critical nature of the issues before us; so, 
let me ask you this: How is it you say the legal landscape has 
changed with a resultant failure of the disability appeals system to 
properly function, when, the judicial system, represented by the Third 
                                                            
105 Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 
UNIV. TULSA L.J. 203, 212 (Winter 1996). 
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Branch of our government remains largely unchanged and seemingly 
unaffected by the passage of time through the course of our nation’s 
history?  What has happened and understanding that, how can the 
present system be fixed? 
 
The Commissioner: 
Mr. Chairman, I’m not a legal scholar, but I have asked myself 
that same question.  Here’s what I have learned.  Our nation’s current 
system of adversarial jurisprudence is part of our rich heritage – a 
legacy from our historical foundation as a British colony.  The 
American judicial system is grounded upon, and adheres to, the 
fundamental tenants of due process of law, providing fair and 
impartial resolution of disputes.  Our system of laws has been hailed 
as the finest in the world, enabling each party to their ‘day in court,’ 
governed by the Constitution, statute, and regulation as well as by 
formal rules of evidence and procedure.  It contemplates an 
adversarial jurisprudence.   
In this, there are unique differences between the American 
judicial system and the Social Security administrative appeals 
process.  Among the differences, the Social Security administrative 
appeals system is non-adversarial – a critical distinction, setting it 
apart from the traditions of the Anglo-American system. 
 
Chairman Issa: 
Madam Commissioner, you make a fine distinction, but the 
question now is, should this distinction, this critical difference, be set 
aside?  Faced with rising costs and delay, the federal courts in 1990 
participated in a grand experiment under the Civil Justice Reform 
Act,106 bringing to the table a variety of dispute resolution practices, 
ranging from arbitration to summary jury trials to mediation.  The 
experiment brought about the ADR Act of 1998,107 mandating each 
federal district court have an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism in place, effectively converting the federal court to a 
multi-door courthouse – where disputes can be resolved traditionally, 
or through alternative means.  In addition, greater control over the 
life of a case was given the judge, removing from the parties the 
                                                            
106 The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2013). 
107 The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §651. 
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control which so often led to delay as one side sought to gain 
advantage over the other, even in the procedural aspects of the case. 
As a result of these actions, the federal courts have largely 
resolved the issues of cost and delay.  Isn’t it time that the 
‘distinction’ in the Social Security appeals process be brought into 
conformity with the American system of justice – a system which has 
shown itself to be flexible, able to meet the demands of a growing 
and ever more diverse society? 
 
The Commissioner: 
Mr. Chairman, the American legal system stands as one of the 
most significant accomplishments in human history.  Bringing its 
principles to the Social Security appeals process – the largest 
administrative adjudicatory system in the world – is a laudable goal.  
It is important, however, when undertaking such a task that we 
understand the genesis of the disability appeals process as we know it 
today.  
Interestingly, when first passed, the Social Security Act did not 
contemplate the presence of claimant’s counsel.  In fact, when 
enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act made no provision for 
representation of claimants.  In 1939, four years after the passage of 
the original Social Security Act, Section 206 was added.  The 
legislative history behind that section explained that “. . . it is not 
contemplated that the services of an agent or attorney will be 
necessary in presenting the vast majority of claims . . .”,108 but a 
provision was nevertheless finally made to provide for representation 
and regulate attorney fees.  As you can see, even in 1939, it was not 
thought likely that claimants would require representation. This is 
because it was thought that the Social Security Administration was 
brought into being to assist the American people – not stand as an 
adversary.  Indeed, even more than a quarter century after the 
passage of the Social Security Act, representation of claimants was 
low. For example, statistics show that “[b]etween January 1966 and 
July 1967 claimants were represented by attorneys in about 19% of 
the cases decided by [then] Hearing Examiners.”109 
                                                            
108 Robert M. Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers . . 
. and Poor People Too, Part II, 40 MISS. L. J. 25, 75 (1968). 
109 Id. at 75.  
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But, all this changed over time.  In fiscal year 2006 a September 
2007 report by SSA’s OIG shows that of the 559,000 claims heard by 
Administrative Law Judges, 439,000 were represented by attorney 
and non-attorney representatives, representing claimants in almost 
80% of all claims appealed.  Examined another way, the OIG notes, 
‘[i]n FY 2006, approximately 26,000 attorneys and 5,000 non-
attorneys represented claimants before ODAR.’ In a period of 40 
years the statistics have virtually become mirror-images of one 
another.  Where 80% of all persons were unrepresented in 1968, by 
2006 80% or all persons are represented.’110   
 
Chairman Issa: 
And, the significance of these numbers? 
 
The Commissioner: 
Put simply, Mr. Chairman, ‘This is not your father’s Oldsmobile.’  
The 1988 General Motors ad sought to reinvent a brand whose time 
had come and, in 2004, went.  It’s not a matter of tweaking the 
operation.  We’ve tried that.  It’s now a question of fundamental 
reform.   
You asked what we need. 
To answer your question, I need authority for reform.  Not 
authority to discipline or control judges; but authority to reform the 
adjudicatory system in which our judges work.  The statistics 
regarding claimant representation signals a fundamental sea-change 
in the legal landscape – a change we have failed to timely recognize, 
and as a result continue to suffer a growing backlog of pending 
appeals. 
 
Chairman Issa: 
I yield the floor to my colleague from Ohio, Congressman Jordan. 
 
 
                                                            
110 Jeffrey S. Wolfe, The Times They Are A Changin’ - A New Jurisprudence 
For Social Security, 29 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 515 (2009) (citing A-
12-07-17057, supra note 16).  
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Mr. Jordan:111 
Thank you Mr. Chairman.  Madam Commissioner, it strikes me 
that what you’re saying actually touches upon more than, as you say, 
‘the legal landscape.’  Am I correct in that?  And if so, would you 
provide an overview of each proposed reform? 
 
The Commissioner: 
In answer to both questions, yes, Congressman.  And, when I 
speak of reform, I am referring to both procedural as well as 
substantive reforms in the disability appeals paradigm. 
To make the disability appeals system begin to work as we have 
all hoped it would, requires a fundamentally fresh viewpoint.  We 
must set aside the assumptions, pressures, perceptions, and turmoil 
surrounding the current system of disability appeals and start anew, 
saving what we can, but changing what we must. 
To address the question of procedural reform, we must first look 
at the foundations of the current system.  Why do we have the system 
now in place?  How did it come into being? 
The present system of disability appeals was devised during a 
time when there were comparatively few claims and when even 
fewer claimants were represented.  The role of the then Hearing 
Examiner, now, Administrative Law Judge, was, as it is today, to 
preside over a nonadversarial proceeding, directed to the question of 
entitlement.  A claimant who was unrepresented was able to rely on 
the assistance of the judge in developing his or her claim.  Under this 
model, the judge, acting like his or her European inquisitorial 
counterpart, searches first for all the evidence favorable to the 
claimant, and then for the evidence which favors the Government.  
The judge then determines, looking to the whole of the evidence, 
whether the claimant is entitled to an award of benefits.  Examined 
another way, the Social Security Administration, whether by design 
or happenstance, devised a unique jurisprudence, founded on both the 
                                                            
111 The dialogue set forth in this and in succeeding paragraphs is solely a 
fictional creation of the authors and not the Honorable James Jordan, Congressman 
from Ohio. 
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Anglo-American and European inquisitorial systems – in effect, a 
hybrid jurisprudence not otherwise employed in the United States.112   
With the passage of time, the problem is self-evident.  This 
hybrid jurisprudence, designed for a time when few persons were 
represented by counsel, is no longer effective in a milieu in which 
representation of claimants is now the norm, complete with late-night 
television advertisements.  In a legal system now populated by 
lawyers, the hybrid jurisprudence hinders the disability appeals 
process, creating self-sustaining backlogs, a fact now evident over 
decades.         
 
Mr. Jordan:    
Does the current system employ rules of procedure or rules of 
evidence? 
 
The Commissioner: 
Formal rules?  It does not Congressman.  Our judges have raised 
this issue, but in our view, implementation of formal rules in the 
current system would be ineffective.  A body of regulations exist 
which govern the hearings process, but key issues remain unresolved, 
such as the need to close the hearings record at the conclusion of a 
hearing – something that can and should be done with the enactment 
of formal rules.    
 
Mr. Jordan:    
You acknowledge the need for such rules then? 
 
The Commissioner 
Not under the current system, Congressman.  As I indicated, what 
we ask for are the resources for system-wide reform.   
 
Mr. Jordan Yields to Chairman Issa: 
I’d prefer, Madam Commissioner, if you can give us an overview 
of these ‘reforms.’ 
 
                                                            
112 Jeffrey S. Wolfe and Lisa Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal 
Administrative Decision Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the 
Adversarial Lawyer, 33 UNIV. TULSA L.J. 293 (1997). 
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The Commissioner: 
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I can.  I have prepared some general remarks, 
outlining the areas of needed reforms.  
I think we sometimes lose sight of our priorities; that we first 
serve the public.  And, the public is watching.  There has been a 
longstanding, shall we call it, ‘debate,’ between the Social Security 
Administration and its corps of Administrative Law Judges.  It is a 
debate which has found its way into the federal courts, before 
arbitrators, and before those in the media; and as you can see, among 
those whom we serve.  Those of us in ‘management’ sometimes see 
things differently from those in the corps of administrative law 
judges – in part, because of our difference in worldview; and in part, 
because there is a unique tension between independence in 
decisionmaking and consistency in decisionmaking.  But, that being 
said, it is time to bridge the gap.  I am mindful of the words of the 
Social Security Advisory Board: 
The agency has much to gain from the advice and input of the 
dedicated professionals in the ALJ corps, at the national, regional, 
and hearing office levels. The ALJ corps, in turn, needs to 
acknowledge the agency’s legitimate desire to ensure that hearing 
decisions are made promptly and consistently. There is an 
understandable and probably inevitable tension between the public’s 
interest in decisional independence and the public’s interest in 
consistency and efficiency, but we believe these interests can be 
reconciled. We urge SSA and its ALJs to work together to develop 
reasonable procedures to reconcile them.113 
 
In that spirit, I come before you today to ask for support for 
needed reforms, which, with your permission, I will outline in the 
balance of my testimony today. 
                                                            
113 The Real Issue . . . And Why Further Restriction of Judicial Independence 
in Social Security is a Bad Idea, ASS’N OF ADMIN. LAW JUDGES, 1-2 (2014), 
https://aalj.org/system/files/documents/the_real_issue_12-19_docx_revision_1-11-
14_docx_fourth__finalcut-accepted-_wfc.pdf (quoting. Improving The Social 
Security Administration's Hearing Process, SOC. SEC.ADVISORY BD ,15 (2006), 
http://www.ssab.gov/Portals/0/OUR_WORK/REPORTS/HearingProcess_2006.pdf
). 
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As the President’s ‘Blue Ribbon Commission’114 on Social 
Security, the Social Security Advisory Board should not be lightly 
regarded.  I fear, though, that too often my predecessors have ignored 
this call for unity.  I stand here before you today to tell you that I 
know we cannot ask for your help unless we acknowledge the value 
of our respective views and agree to work more closely with one 
another.  Only then can meaningful reform take place. 
 
Chairman Issa: 
A lofty sentiment Commissioner, but not one that the agency’s 
track record gives us any hope for real change. 
The Commissioner: 
How shall I say this?   Trust me Mr. Chairman, I’m from the 
Government and I’m here to help. 
 
[laughter] 
 
Chairman Issa: 
You may proceed Commissioner. 
 
 
The Commissioner: 
A fundamental needed reform lies in the jurisprudence of our 
hearing procedures.  A change of such magnitude appears costly, but 
with offsetting costs, we think such a change may not, in fact, be as 
costly as we once thought.  Here’s what we propose.  
The former jurisprudence must end, replaced by a neutral, 
collaborative jurisprudence in which the Social Security 
Administration is a party – an active participant.  Reforms include: 
• Empowering claimants.  Establish within the Office of General 
Counsel, a “Disability Representative” or D.R.,” within Social 
Security’s OGC, and who, in turn, supervises ADR’s or Assistant 
Disability Representatives, either attorneys or certified non-lawyer 
representatives, assigned to work within each Hearing Office.  The 
presence of the “DR” empowers claimants by providing systemic 
flexibility.  Rather than wait stolidity ‘in line,’ for “your turn” at a 
hearing, each case proceeding one after the other as if all were cut 
                                                            
114 Id. at 2.  
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from the same cloth, the DR opens the possibility of a resolution 
tailored to the particular facts of the individual appeal, advancing the 
case to conclusion at the earliest opportunity.  At present there exists 
a mounting backlog of pending hearings because there is no viable 
mechanism by which appeals can be individually addressed and 
resolved early.  The overwhelming majority of pending appeals are 
resolved in order of their filing.  Cases which could be resolved early 
in the appeals life-cycle cannot be systematically addressed at an 
earlier time.  No mechanism exists by which such cases can be so 
advanced.  Instead, 85 – 90% of all cases are heard in order of their 
filing.  In today’s system, this same percentage is resolved, only by a 
full hearing.  The result is a growing backlog, inherent in a system 
which lacks the flexibility to resolve those cases which can resolved 
early.  The “DR” provides an avenue of communication, injecting 
into the present system a new “party” – the Agency itself, which has 
not, heretofore, been present as a “party.” 
• The Disability Representative is thus charged to advocate for 
the correct result in any given claim pending before an administrative 
law judge.  Ready access to the “ADR” will enable early resolution 
of pending claims and balanced development of the administrative 
record.  The establishment of the Office of the Disability 
Representative acknowledges the Agency as a “party” to the 
disability hearing, and in so doing returns the judge to her status as a 
neutral, passive decisionmaker, thus ending the so-called “Three Hat 
Jurisprudence.”  To this point the Agency is not, in fact, a “party” to 
the proceedings before administrative law judges.  Thus, should the 
Agency disagree with a judge’s decision to award benefits there is no 
one present at the hearing who can file an appeal; as the only party 
generally present is the claimant (who can, as a party, lodge an 
appeal with the Appeals Council.)   
• The DR empowers claimants because he/she becomes an early 
point of contact, accessible to the claimant’s representative, 
independent of any contact with the judge, early in the life of an 
appeal.  This allows, among other outcomes, early agreed-upon case 
disposition as permitted by the evidence.  Doing so, ends the current 
system of rigidly scheduled hearings, each case standing in lock-step 
one behind the other in a frozen line, with little alternative but to hear 
every case despite its merits, and as history has shown, inevitably 
expanding the ongoing backlog.  The DR remedies this circumstance 
by offering early alternatives for case resolution, either by enabling 
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early additional fact finding or discovery; amending the onset date; or 
limiting the issues to be resolved at a hearing.       
• The presence of the Agency as a “party” to the proceedings, 
through the DR also serves to increase disposition rates, with an 
attendant reduction in the number of cases requiring a full hearing, 
enabling fast-track hearings where only limited issues are presented 
for hearing.   
• The presence of the Agency by and through the DR also enables 
the implementation of multiple hearing tracks, empowering the 
claimant and the DR to determine the degree of case management 
necessary, and whether cases may be ‘fast-tracked,’ fostering early 
case management with counsel where the claimant is represented.    
• The presence of the Agency as a party enhances the judicial role 
and function, enabling an early case-management function with 
active judicial involvement through the life of the hearings process, 
all as part of the adoption of a comprehensive rules of procedure.  
This enables active discussion early in the life of a claim between the 
judge and the parties, setting deadlines and scheduling suitable to the 
nature of the claim. 
• The presence of the Social Security Administration as a “party” 
enables burden of discovery and case development to be shifted from 
the judge (who is now said to act in an inquisitorial role, with a duty 
to develop the record, much like a party) to the Agency in the person 
of the DR; returning the judge to her traditional role as an impartial 
neutral.  It is the Agency, then, and not the judge, who bears the 
burden of ensuring the record is complete.  Disagreements between 
the Agency and the claimant about needed development (such as 
ordering the claimant to undergo a consultative examination) may 
then be neutrally decided by the judge, who no longer has a burden of 
development, akin to that of a party.    
• Appellate review is limited to those cases/decisions which raise 
issues of significant public policy and/or which involve significant 
issues of statutory/regulatory interpretation affecting the disability 
program.115  
• Both the Agency (acting by and through the DR) and the 
claimant are thus limited in their right of appeal, such that questions 
of fact which do not raise issues of significant public policy or 
                                                            
115 Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 37 at 580-83. 
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statutory/regulatory interpretation affecting the disability program are 
not subject of appeal. 
• Similarly, appellate review by the Appeals Council is limited to 
those cases, which present issues of significant public policy or 
statutory/regulatory interpretation in matters affecting disability 
adjudication. 
• Today, Appeals Council decisions are not precedential.116  The 
limitation of appeals to the Appeals Council, should be accompanied 
by a change in the nature of appellate review, such that Appeals 
Council decisions establish precedent, thereby ensuring consistency 
of decision making; adopting principles of appellate review much as 
an appeals court in the traditional court system.  This includes 
granting deference to the facts found by ‘trial court’ (the 
administrative law judge), such that appeal is based solely on 
questions of law, regulation and policy and not a re-weighing of the 
facts.  Such a review will, of necessity, recognize the “harmless 
error” rule, deferring to the administrative law judge’s findings by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
• Part and parcel of such reform necessarily includes adoption of 
a comprehensive set of rules, necessary to govern the hearings 
process, establishing deadlines, closing the record and provide 
thereby ascertainable and enforceable benchmarks by which the case 
advances to conclusion.  At present, no such affirmative rules exist.   
• Reform monetary expenditures, ending travel reimbursement 
for counsel and reversing the current “pay-for-delay” contingent 
attorney’s fee, and establishing a revised contingent fee linked to 
early case resolution.  The current contingent attorney’s fee 
incentivizes delay.  The current attorney’s fee award is 25% of past 
due benefits or $6,000 whichever is less, so the longer the case 
decision is delayed, the greater the attorney’s fee.117  Reversing this, 
so that an attorney is paid more the earlier a case is decided 
incentivizes early case resolution and will fuel a new ‘reformed’ 
adjudicatory framework in which the attorney’s motivation is aligned 
with that of her client.118         
                                                            
116 Id. at 582-83. 
117 Id. at 578 n.240. 
118 See Id. at 579-80, in which the authors suggest the following alternative to 
the current “pay-for-delay” attorney’s fee: 
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Chairman Issa 
Commissioner, I would be most interested in exploring each of 
these potential reforms.  My question generally is whether in your 
opinion implementation of these reforms will, in fact, be effective in 
1) reducing the backlog; and 2) decreasing individual case 
disposition time?  Will these reforms take us further from the demise 
of the disability program? 
 
The Commissioner 
In a word, Chairman Issa, “yes.” 
 
 
                                                            
 
One example is a flat fee. Upon an award, an attorney or 
representative would be entitled to an established fee, regardless 
of the amount of past-due benefits or the amount of time spent 
preparing the case. The amount of the fee would be governed by 
the complexity of the case, much as is the case now with a fee 
petition. 
 
Adopting the current maximum fee of $ 6,000, the ALJ would 
determine whether counsel would receive one-third of the 
maximum [($ 2,000)], two-thirds of the maximum [($ 4,000)], or 
the maximum fee [($ 6,000)], dependent upon the complexity of 
the case. . . .Alternatively, attorney fees could be time-dependent. 
Resolution of the claim within six months of filing the Request 
for Hearing would result in payment of the maximum fee of $ 
6,000. Hearing within twelve months would result in payment of 
$ 4,000, whereas any resolution after twelve months would result 
in a fee of $ 2,000. The same rules for payment would apply as 
outlined above. Time-dependent resolution encourages counsel to 
proceed with the case, which would benefit the claimant, who 
otherwise stands in need of a timely decision. It is even possible 
for the two scenarios to be combined, such that the primary 
determining factor is time, and upon motion of counsel the ALJ 
may increase an otherwise lower fee based upon complexity of 
the case [or similar factors per the HALLEX]. . . . Realignment 
of the fee structure accomplishes a positive realignment of both 
the claimant's and the representative's interests. 
Id. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
 
Whether Adjudicasaurus Rex survives is a question of will.  But 
how is this to be expressed?  Let us assume, in the previous 
hypothetical dialogue, that Chairman Issa calls yet a further witness, 
a systems engineering expert, called upon to examine the efficacy of 
the current system of hearings and appeals and to describe, 
symbolically, the problem now facing the Social Security 
adjudicatory process/paradigm.  
 
 Chairman Issa 
I want to explore one additional question.  How do we assess the 
efficacy of the reforms which you have outlined?  To answer this 
question, the process we follow should be clear.  I have asked 
Professor Smith,119 a renowned expert in systems engineering, to 
speak with us.  Professor, would you be so kind as to share with the 
Committee and the American people, why a systems engineering 
viewpoint is necessary?   
 
Professor Smith 
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.  First, 
let me give you a brief overview of systems engineering.  
“Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary field of engineering that 
focuses on how to design and manage complex engineering systems 
over their life cycles . . . Systems engineering deals with work-
processes, optimization methods, and risk management tools in such 
projects. It overlaps technical and human-centered disciplines such 
as control engineering, industrial engineering, software 
engineering, organizational studies, and project management. 
                                                            
119 The dialogue set forth in this and in succeeding paragraphs is solely a 
fictional creation of the authors and not anyone living or dead other than our 
hypothetical “Professor Smith.”  
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Systems engineering ensures that all likely aspects of a project or 
system are considered, and integrated into a whole.”120 
The disability hearings and appeals process is a system, 
susceptible to an engineering analysis, while remaining mindful of 
the overarching human ideals upon which it stands – to provide due 
process, that is, a full, fair and impartial hearing.  In such an analysis, 
we must be mindful that the system does not overwhelm the ideal.   
Analysis of the current Social Security disability appeals 
paradigm necessarily involves a significant number of systemic 
variables, focused primarily upon organizational structures and 
principals of project management.  I will not, however, go there 
today.  Instead, I wish to make evident a simple conclusion and in 
doing so, demonstrate a clear need for a new course – in effect 
demonstrating an inevitable need for change. 
Assume the following, and I apologize for the seeming 
complexity of the “math,” but here goes.  If I many direct your 
attention to the Smart Board to my left . . . 
Using present hearing protocols as followed by ODAR in the 
hearings and appeals process, I’m going to focus on a set of simple 
variables to illustrate my point, as follows:    
 
“R” represents the number of hearings pending resolved by all 
means. 
“H” represents the number of hearings pending decided by 
hearing. 
“S” represents the number of hearings pending decided by Senior 
Attorney Adjudicators without a hearing. 
“D” represents the number of hearings dismissed121 before 
hearing. 
Assume the following is then true: 
R = H + S + D; where the number of pending hearings resolved 
(“R”) is the sum of those decided by means of a full, formal hearing 
(“H”); those decided by Senior Attorney Adjudicators (“S”); and 
those dismissed (“D”) before hearing.   
                                                            
120Systems Engineering, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_engineering (last visited August 9, 2015). 
121 A dismissal is not a “decision.” 
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Assume further that S = 7.3 %; signifying that less than 10% of 
pending hearings are decided by Senior Attorney Adjudicators 
(SAAs) without a hearing.122  In considering the SAA number, “7.3 
                                                            
122 Congressional Response Report, The Office of Disability Adjudication and 
Review’s Hearings Backlog and Processing Times, No. A-12-11-21192, OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,   (June 2011), 
file:///C:/Users/Eflow/Documents/Articles/Social%20Security%20Dinosaurs/OIG
%20Senior%20Atty%20Dispositions%20A-12-11-21192.pdf, which provides that 
“[i]n FY 2010, SAAs issued 54,186 OTR [on the record, meaning, without hearing] 
decisions, representing about 7.3 percent of all dispositions.” Id. at 6. 
Following is an excerpt from Table 1: OIG Pending Hearings Backlog 
Projections (Based on FY 2012 Budget).  SAA dispositions are shown for Fiscal 
Year 2010, with projections declining slightly through Fiscal Year 2013.  Id. at 
page 3.  However, despite the small decline, the number is fairly consistent over 
time, decisions by “Senior Attorney Adjudicators” (SAA’s) representing the only 
other alternative by which to decide a case pending hearing before an ALJ. 
 
Workloads/Staffing FY2010 
Actual 
FY2011 
Projected 
FY2012 
Projected 
FY2013 
Projected 
     
SAA 
Dispositions 
54,186 53,200 49,200 48,600 
 
That this is so, is evident from the full Table, shown below.  Case dispositions 
occur only by decisions by Administrative Law Judges, who, by reason of the rigid 
single-track hearings procedure, may only decide a pending hearing by holding a 
hearing; or by Senior Attorney Adjudicators who may only decide cases without a 
hearing, and then, may only decide a pending hearing favorably.  See SSA OIG 
Audit Report, Effects of the Senior Attorney Adjudicator Program on Hearing 
Workloads, A-12-13-23002, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,    
1 (June 2013). An adverse decision may only be made by an ALJ , which, as noted, 
requires a hearing. 
. 
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%,” I make the simple point that even with the SAA activity, a 
sizeable number of all pending hearings will be decided only after a 
hearing.  Now add in dismissals. 123  Using the numbers from calendar 
year 2011 per the 2012 OIG report,124 administrative law judges 
disposed of 740,000 pending hearings; of which 111,000 were 
dismissals.125  And, while a dismissal is not a “decision,” it 
nevertheless results in a case disposition.  Thus, of the total number 
of pending hearings resolved by administrative law judges, only 15% 
were by reason of dismissal, that is, [744,000/111,000 = 15%.]  
The point?  The equation, R = H + S + D represents an inherent 
rigidity in the disability hearings process.  In effect the adjudicatory 
process is frozen in place, unable to do more than it presently does, 
resulting in a continuously rising backlog.  In point of fact, the 
hearings process is quickly submerging under a backlog of more than 
1,000,000 pending hearings.  It is a path that will bring us to the same 
crossroads reached by the dinosaurs.  Theirs was a path set in the 
irreversible suction of the tar pits and the slow mire of antediluvian 
                                                            
123 This number does not include dismissals of the Request for Hearing, where 
the claimant withdraws or abandons his/her Request or passes away.  As noted by 
the Office of Inspector General in a July 2010, “[w]e found that dismissal rates 
varied among ODAR’s 10 regions. Specifically, dismissal rates ranged from a low 
of 14 percent in the Dallas Region to a high of 23 percent in the Kansas City 
Region . . .” See SSA OIG, Congressional Response Report, Hearing Request 
Dismissals, A-07-10-21049, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,  7 
(July 2010),  
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/summary/html/A-07-10-21049.html.   
More precisely, “[i]n FY 2011, ODAR issued over 793,000 dispositions, of 
which approximately 740,000 were issued by ALJs and over 53,000 were issued by 
Attorney Adjudicators . . . Of the 740,000 dispositions issued by ALJs, 
approximately 629,000 dispositions resulted in an allowance or denial decision and 
the remaining 111,000 dispositions were dismissals of the hearing request. A 
hearing request can be dismissed for a variety of reasons, including failure of the 
claimant to appear at the hearing, the claimant choosing to withdraw the hearing 
request, or death of the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957, 416.1457.”  See SSA, 
OIG, Congressional Response Report, The Social Security Administration’s Review 
of Administrative Law Judges’ Decisions, A-07-12-21234, OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 1 n.3 (March 2012), 
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-07-12-21234.pdf.  
124 Congressional Response Report, The Social Security Administration’s 
Review of Administrative Law Judges’ Decisions, 1 n. 3. 
125 Id. 
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bogs.  With no ability to adapt to a changing environment they 
became extinct.   
It need not be so for the Social Security Disability hearings and 
appeals process. 
 
Mr. Lankford   
I’m glad to hear you say that Professor.  But what can be done?  I 
am interested in a long-term pragmatic solution to the problem.  I 
catch your point.  The “system,” as you so simply describe it, is, in 
actuality a hidebound relic from a former age – when, as the Supreme 
Court noted in the Perales case in 1971,126 only 20,000 cases were 
pending on appeal nationwide; when only 19% of all claimants were 
represented; and when the decision-maker was a “Hearing 
Examiner,” committed to the disability appeals system as an agent of 
social policy, and not as a “judge” committed to due process.   
So, please, if you will, what is the solution? 
 
 
Professor Smith 
Even a quick glance at the formula leads one to conclude that the 
only way to increase output in this system is to require the actors to 
work harder – to decide more cases.   
But, if we assume that the character of the cases does not change, 
then “working harder” necessarily means less time on each case.  
Even more significantly, “working harder” is further limited by the 
number of hours in a competitive workday.  My point – “working 
harder” is, itself, inherently limited.  Given the continuing increase in 
applications for disability benefits, this equation represents, at best, a 
temporary solution, not to mention the question whether reducing the 
amount of time spent on a case is to effectively limit or even negate 
required due process – an instance of the system overwhelming the 
ideal.  
Thus, R = H + S + D is destined to failure; as there is no external 
factor inherently a part of the equation which allows for increases in 
cases resolved beyond “working harder.”  In other words, there is no 
way for the current system to close the gap in the backlog, much less 
stay apace.  Close review reveals an interesting bias.  R = H + S + D 
                                                            
126 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
 
 " 

	 59
is entirely one-sided.  It effectively describes a closed system.  
Resolution under this formula is dependent entirely upon activity 
only able to be initiated by two ODAR actors – judges or senior 
attorneys.  For all intents and purposes, there is no decisional 
pathway from the claimant to the judge, except to have a hearing.  
More to the point, there is no mechanism in this closed-loop formula 
which contemplates, much less encourages, case resolution initiated 
by the claimant’s representative or the agency itself.  Herein lies the 
solution to what is otherwise a self-contained and thence, limited or 
closed system.   
 
Mr. Lankford   
If I follow you, you’re saying that under the current system of 
hearings before administrative law judges there is an absolute bar to a 
higher disposition rate absent appointing more judges? 
 
Professor Smith       
That’s correct Congressman Lankford.  I believe the solution is to 
update the equation so that it no longer describes a closed system, but 
an open architecture, embracing the Social Security Administration 
as a “party” to the hearing before the administrative law judge.  In 
effect, bringing the Agency to the table where it has to this point 
refused to be seated. 
 
Mr. Issa 
Isn’t the Agency a party to the disability hearing now? 
  
Professor Smith 
No, sir.  It is not.  The Agency has no representative at a 
disability hearing and otherwise has constructed no pathway by 
which a claimant or a claimant’s representative can communicate 
with the Agency after a Request for Hearing has been submitted.  
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Perales,127 noted, the 
role of the agency is largely that of adjudicator.  The increasing 
presence of lawyers as claimant’s representatives has necessarily 
changed the hearings and appeals paradigm.  As in any adjudicatory 
system, there must be a mechanism for claims resolution apart from 
                                                            
127 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
 
60 	

 !"
hearing.  In the courts, this usually manifests itself in the ability of 
both counsel to reach resolution by agreement, generally termed 
“alternative dispute resolution.”  This represents a degree of 
adjudicatory flexibility which serves the much needed purpose of 
venting steam, relieving pressure on an already overburdened court 
system.  No such relief valve exists in Social Security’s system of 
hearings and appeals.  Simply put, there is no representative of the 
agency present with whom claimant’s counsel may confer. 
 
Mr. Issa 
What about the judge?  Isn’t she a representative of the Agency? 
 
Professor Smith 
No sir.  Under the Administrative Procedure Act128 the 
administrative law judge is a neutral and impartial decision-maker.  
By definition, should the judge represent the Agency, she cannot be 
impartial and the supposed neutral role of the judge is transformed 
into fiction.   
 
Mr. Issa 
The bottom line professor? 
 
Professor Smith 
The necessity of a hearing in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
increases the time to disposition, each case proceeding in lockstep 
with no alternative but a hearing, apart from a Senior Attorney (SAA) 
decision or judicial dismissal.   
This mandate, effectively requiring more than seventy-eight 
percent of all claims proceed to resolution only after a hearing, marks 
a dramatic departure from the experience had in the various state and 
federal court systems of the Nation.  While the settlement rate 
literature emphasizes that “the definition of what constitutes a 
settlement is “critical” in studying settlement rates,”129 it clear from 
several studies that relatively high settlement rates in the courts 
(though variable, dependent on the type of case) diverge sharply from 
                                                            
128 5 U.S.C. A. §551(2011), et seq.  
129 Theodore Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and 
Why Should We Care? 6 J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 115 (March 2009). 
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the single-track disability hearing procedure which, apart from the 
limited actions of Senior Attorney Adjudicators, signals a hearing in 
almost seventy-eight percent of all pending hearings.130   
Specifically, I point to Clermont and Schwab’s report.131  They 
compiled a “report of settlement rates . . . based on data on federal 
court case terminations gathered by the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts (AO) from 1979 to 2006. They reported on both 
employment discrimination cases and other civil cases and find that 
about 70 percent of both groups of cases terminated by 
settlement.”132  In other words, over a twenty-seven year period the 
researchers concluded that 70% of civil cases filed in the United 
States Courts were resolved without trial. 
More to the point, the resolution of hearings pending before 
ODAR is, as a result of an antiquated, inflexible hearing procedure, 
effectively the mirror image of case resolution before the federal 
courts.  In other words, rather than resolve seventy percent of all 
cases with no hearing, or with a least a limited hearing, ODAR 
proceeds to a full hearing in seventy- eight percent of pending 
appeals.  Is it any wonder that there is a mounting backlog of pending 
hearings?  
 
Mr. Issa  
Thank you, Professor.  Very insightful.  This will conclude the 
current proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
130 This number is reached by subtracting both the SAA OTR rate (7.3%) and 
the dismissal rate (111,000/740,000 or 15%), leaving a remaining 77.7% of 
pending hearings  that must, for lack of any other pathway, proceed to hearing.  
131 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?  3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 
(2009), cited by Eisenberg and Lanvers, supra, note 128 at 44.  
132 Id. 
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X. AFTERWORD 
 
 On October 29, 2015, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act 
of 2015 (H.R.1314).133  Included within the Act are provisions 
designed to alleviate the impending insolvency of the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Trust Fund, scheduled before the Act’s passage 
to exhaust all funds in the fourth quarter 2016.134  While seemingly 
good news, the Act135 is but a stopgap.  It neither addresses 
significant underlying substantive issues, nor permanently resolves 
already critical budget shortfalls.136  In a word, the Act “kicks Social 
Security disability” down the road to the near future, taking what 
might have been a critical 2016 election-year issue off the political 
table, avoiding the so-called “Third Rail of American Politics.”137 
                                                            
133 See The Hon. James Lankford, United States Senator, Oklahoma, Senator 
Lankford Offers Real Reforms to Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 
LANKFORD SENATE PRESS RELEASE  (October 29, 2015), 
http://www.lankford.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-lankford-offers-real-
reforms-to-social-security-disability-insurance-program. 
134 See Mark Schleifstein,  Social Security Disability Pressure Eased by Budget 
Compromise, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (October 30, 2015) at 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/10/budget_compromise_includes_nee
.html, who writes: 
But collections at that rate aren't adequate to pay all 
disability beneficiaries by the third quarter of 2016. And the 
Social Security trust fund, on which the main Social Security 
benefit program relies, might be exhausted as early as 2034, 
according to Congressional Research Service reports.” 
135 The text of H.R. 1314 may be found at: House of Representatives, House 
Bill 1314, U.S. CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-
bill/1314. http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20151026/BILLS-114hr-PIH-
BUDGET.pdf. 
136 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Agreement is Seen as Short-Term Relief for 
Medicare and Social Security, NEW YORK TIMES (October 27, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1KE8O2b. (Observing, “AARP, a lobby for older Americans, praised 
the agreement on Tuesday, though it said the legislation ‘will not provide a long-
term solution to the funding challenge facing the Social Security disability 
insurance trust fund.’”). 
137 The “Third Rail” of American politics is a descriptor attributed to former 
Speaker Tip O’Neill, made in response to proposed cuts to the Social Security 
program by the Regan Administration.  William Safire wrote in the New York 
Times Magazine, saying, “[a]nyone who tries to touch it [Social Security] gets 
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Rachel Greszler writing for The Daily Signal comments: 
Congress has been kicking the can down the road on disability 
insurance reform for decades, and 2016 should have been the end of 
the road—time for meaningful reform. Instead, policymakers want to 
provide a little more roadway for the disability insurance program by 
whacking off a portion of Social Security’s roadway.138 
Mike Flynn, writing for Breitbart is equally critical: 
Next year, the disability trust fund will be completely exhausted. 
Over the next ten years, the disability program faces a $256 billion 
shortfall. 
The . . . budget deal tries to duct-tape this shortfall. The deal 
agreed to by the House transfers $150 billion from the Social 
Security Trust Fund to plug the growing hole for disability payments. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Social Security program itself faces 
serious solvency issues, the House budget again uses the Trust Fund 
like a slush fund to paper over its own mistakes. 
Rather than do the hard work of reforming a disability program 
that has exploded and evolved into a de facto welfare program, the 
House has chosen to kick the problem down the road.139 
                                                            
electrocuted.”  William Safire, Third Rail, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (February 18, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/magazine/18wwlnsafire.t.html?_r=0. 
See also Tom Keane, Touching the Third Rail of Politics: Democrats Balk at a 
New Formula for Calculating Social Security, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 21, 2013), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/04/20/social-security-third-rail-
politics/YWLU4kyHo6y8ivZJabCRMK/story.html (“Social Security has always 
been the so-called ‘third rail’ of politics, and Democrats (and a fair number of 
Republicans) have pandered to crowds for years at the slightest hint of belt-
tightening.”). 
138 Rachel Greszler, Budget Deal Kicks the Can on Disability Insurance, Robs 
$150 Billion from Social Security, THE DAILY SIGNAL (October 27, 2015), 
http://dailysignal.com/2015/10/27/budget-deal-kicks-the-can-on-disability-
insurance-robs-150-billion-from-social-security/. 
139  Mike Flynn, House Budget Robs Social Security for Welfare Payments, 
BREITBART (October 29, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-
government/2015/10/29/house-budget-robs-social-security-welfare-payments/.  
Flynn writes further:  
One of the more egregious acts is to take $150 Billion out of 
the Social Security Trust Fund to prop up the program’s 
disability benefits. The Social Security raid will keep the 
disability program solvent through 2022, at which time Congress 
is likely to again raid the federal pension 
program...Unsurprisingly, the disability program is running out 
 
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 The combined FICA allocation from both employers and 
employees is 12.4%, each paying 6.2%.  Of this, 1.8% is allocated to 
the Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits Trust Fund.140 The 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 takes the current FICA allocation 
from 1.8% to 2.37% for budget years 2016, 2017 and 2018, reverting 
thereafter to 1.8%.141  The “fix” is effective in the short run, but 
leaves open the question of future funding. 
 Substantive disability reforms were proposed by U.S. Senator 
James Lankford of Oklahoma, including a proposal to end “double 
dipping,” which at present allows persons to receive disability 
benefits predicated on an inability to work, while simultaneously 
collecting state unemployment benefits, available to those who are 
looking for a job.142  Senator Lankford’s amendments (No. 2755),143 
also include elimination of the “reconsideration” stage of the 
disability determination process; thereby “speeding up” the appeals 
process once initially denied.144  At present, a claimant must make an 
initial application and if denied, seek “reconsideration” within sixty 
days of the initial denial.  Eliminating this second review potentially 
shortens the overall appeals process. 
Senator Lankford also proposed changes to the hearings and 
appeals process before federal Administrative Law Judges, including 
adoption of formal rules of procedure and tougher evidentiary 
standards.145  At bottom, however, the 1950’s jurisprudential system 
remains fundamentally untouched by Senator Lankford’s 
amendments.  Notably lacking is the keystone to needed evolutionary 
                                                            
of money. According to the recent Trustees report on Social 
Security, the disability program pays out around $30 billion more 
in benefits than it collects in taxes.  Id. 
140 See Mark Schleifstein, Social Security Disability Pressure Eased by Budget 
Compromise, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (October 30, 2015), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/10/budget_compromise_includes_nee
.html.  
141 Id. 
142Sen. Lankford's SSDI Amendment Continues Progress on Improving the 
Program, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET (November 2, 2015), 
http://crfb.org/blogs/sen-lankfords-ssdi-amendment-continues-progress-improving-
program. 
143 Id. 
144 See CLERMONT AND SCHWAB, supra note 130 at 44.   
145 See SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note 133, at 46.   
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change, establishing a new role for the agency in disability hearings.  
At present, some 1,500 federal Administrative Law Judges appointed 
under the Administrative Procedure Act,146 now preside over de novo 
disability appeals within the Office of Disability Adjudication and 
Review.  Absent a new role – as a “party” in disability hearings – the 
agency continues its long-standing function as an adjudicator,147 
forsaking all methods of dispute resolution save conduct of a hearing 
in conformity with an outdated 1950’s quasi-inquisitorial 
jurisprudence.148  This configuration effectively ensures an inability 
to engage in the kind of flexible decisionmaking, discussed supra, 
critical to resolution of the continuing and ever-growing backlog of 
disability appeals from underlying administrative denials. 
Simply put, it is the absence of jurisprudential flexibility which 
effectively hobbles the current hearings and appeals process.  Senator 
Lankford’s amendments are important first steps, signaling the need 
and the willingness for modernization of the current jurisprudence.  
Social Security is no longer the “Third Rail of American Politics.”  It 
has become the “Magnet for American Reform,” preserving in its re-
casting, a lifeline for millions.  The alternative is found among the 
bones on display in museums across the nation. 
 
 
                                                            
146 5 U.S.C. A. §551(2011). 
147 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
148 EISENBERG AND LANVERS, supra note 128, at 44. As noted supra note 113, 
the agency’s Senior Attorney Adjudicator program only allowed for disposition of 
favorable claims, but, served only to dispose of some 7.3% of pending claims. 
